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 VOLUME 85 JANUARY 1972 NUMBER 3
 HARVARD LAW REVIEW
 FAIRNESS AND UTILITY IN TORT THEORY
 George P. Fletcher
 Professor Fletcher challenges the traditional account of the de-
 velopinent of tort doctrine as a shift from an unmoral standard of
 strict liability for directly causing harm to a moral standard based
 on fault. He then sets out two paradigms of liability to serve as con-
 structs for understanding competing ideological viewpoints about the
 proper role of tort sanctions. He asserts that the paradigm of re-
 ciprocity, which looks only to the degree of risk imposed by the
 parties to a lawsuit on each other, and to the existence of possible
 excusing conditions, provides greater protection of individual in-
 terests than the paradigm of reasonableness, which assigns liability
 instrumentally on the basis of a utilitarian calculus. Finally, Pro-
 fessor Fletcher examines stylistic differences between the two para-
 digms which may explain the modern preference for the paradigm
 of reasonableness.
 I. Two PARADIGMS OF LIABILITY
 T ORT theory is suffering from declining expectations. Com-
 mentators still chronicle cases and expound doctrine for
 practitioners. But the thrust of the academic literature is to
 convert the tort system into something other than a mechanism for
 determining the just distribution of accident losses. Some writers
 seek to convert the set of discrete litigations into a makeshift me-
 dium of accident insurance or into a mechanism for maximizing
 social utility by shifting the costs of accidents (or accident pre-
 vention) to the party to whom it represents the least disutility.
 Thus the journals cultivate the idiom of cost-spreading, risk-
 distribution and cost-avoidance.' Discussed less and less are
 *Professor of Law, University of California at Los Angeles. B.A. University
 of California at Berkeley, Ig60; J.D. University of Chicago, I964; M. Comp. L.
 University of Chicago, I965.
 1 The leading work is G. CALABRESI, THE COSTS OF ACCDENTS (1970) [herein-
 after cited as CALABRESI]. See also A. EHRENZWEIG, NEGLIGENCE WITHOUT FAULT
 (I5I), reprinted in 54 CALIF. L. REV. I422 (I966); J. FLEMING, THE LAW OF
 TORTS 9-I4 (3d ed. I965); Calabresi, The Decision for Accidents: An Approach
 to Nonfault Allocation of Costs, 78 HARV. L. REV. 7I3 (I965) ; Calabresi, Does
 the Fault System Optimally Control Primary Accident Costs?, 33 LAW & CONTEMP.
 PROB. 429 (I968); Calabresi, Some Thoughts on Risk Distribution and the Law
 of Torts, 70 YALE L.J. 499 (Ig6I); Keeton, Conditional Fault in the Law of
 Torts, 72 HARv. L. REV. 40I (1959); Morris, Hazardous Enterprises and Risk
 Bearing Capacity, 6I YALE L.J. II72 (I952).
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 538 HARVARD LAW REVIEW [Vol. 85:537
 precisely those questions that make tort law a unique repository
 of intuitions of corrective justice: What is the relevance of risk-
 creating conduct to the just distribution of wealth? What is the
 rationale for an individual's "right" to recover for his losses?
 What are the criteria for justly singling out some people and mak-
 ing them, and not their neighbors, bear the costs of accidents?
 These persistent normative questions are the stuff of tort theory,
 but they are now too often ignored for the sake of inquiries about
 insurance and the efficient allocation of resources.
 The fashionable questions of the time are instrumentalist:2
 What social value does the rule of liability further in this case?
 Does it advance a desirable goal, such as compensation, deter-
 rence, risk-distribution, or minimization of accident costs? True,
 within this instrumentalist framework some writers are concerned
 about the goal of vindicating the community's sense of fairness.3
 But this approach generally makes the issue of fairness look like
 the other goals of the tort system. Any other notion of fairness -
 one that is not a goal, but a non-instrumentalist reason for re-
 distributing losses - strikes some contemporary writers as akin
 2 For a discussion of instrumentalism in legal reasoning, see Dworkin, Morality
 and the Law, N.Y. REV. BOOKS, May 22, I969, at 29.
 3 See CALABRESI 29I-308; 2 F. HARPER & F. JAMES, THE LAW OF TORTS 743
 (1956) [hereinafter cited as HARPER & JAMES] ("[The law of torts] must satisfy
 the ethical or moral sense of the community, its feeling of what is fair and
 just."). Professors Keeton and O'Connell discuss the obligations of motorists with-
 out converting the issue into a question of community expectations. R. KEETON &
 J. O'CONNELL, BASIC PROTECTION FOR THE TRAFFIC VICTIM 256-72 (I965).
 ' This bias toward converting values which are ends in themselves into in-
 strumentalist goals is well illustrated by the history of the exclusionary rule in
 search and seizure cases. The leading modern decisions establishing the exclusion-
 ary rule relied on two prominent rationales for the rule: (i) the imperative of
 judicial integrity, and (2) the desirability of deterring unconstitutional police
 behavior. See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 659 (i96i); Elkins v. United States,
 364 U.S. 206, 222 (ig60). Preserving judicial integrity is a non-instrumentalist
 value -like retribution, fairness, and justice. One preserves judicial integrity not
 because it will produce good in the future but because it is "imperative" -it is
 in the nature of the judicial process -to do so. This is not the kind of value with
 which most writers in recent years could feel comfortable. As a result, the litera-
 ture tended to tie the exclusionary rule almost exclusively to the goal of deterring
 improper police behavior. See Allen, Due Process and State Criminal Procedures:
 Another Look, 48 Nw. U.L. REV. i6, 34 (I953); LaFave & Remington, Controlling
 the Police: The Judge's Role in Making and Reviewing Law Enforcement Deci-
 sions, 63 Mici. L. REV. 987, I002-03 (I965); Oaks, Studying the Exclusionary
 Rule in Search and Seizure, 37 U. CHI. L. REV. 665, 668-7, (I970). The implica-
 tion of tying the exclusionary rule to the goal of deterrenee is that if suppressing
 evidence does not in fact deter the police -and there is reason to believe that it
 does not, see L. TIFFANY, D. McINTYRE, JR. & D. ROTENBERG, DETECTnON OF CRIME
 IOI, i83-99 (i967) -then the entire justification for the rule collapses. See the
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 I972] FAIRNESS AND UTILITY 539
 to a nonrational community taboo.5
 Reluctant as they are to assay issues of fairness, tort theorists
 tend to regard the existing doctrinal framework of fault and
 strict liability as sufficiently rich to express competing views about
 fairly shifting losses.6 This conceptual framework accounts for a
 number of traditional beliefs about tort law history. One of these
 beliefs is that the ascendancy of fault in the late nineteenth cen-
 tury reflected the infusion of moral sensibility into the law of
 torts.7 That new moral sensibility is expressed sometimes as the
 principle that wrongdoers ought to pay for their wrongs.8 An-
 other traditional view is that strict tort liability is the analogue of
 strict criminal liability, and that if the latter is suspect, so is the
 former.9 The underlying assumption of both these tenets is that
 negligence and strict liability are antithetical rationales of lia-
 bility. This assumed antithesis is readily invoked to explain the
 ebbs and flows of tort liability. Strict liability is said to have
 prevailed in early tort history, fault supposedly held sway in the
 late nineteenth century, with strict liability now gaining ground.10
 These beliefs about tort history are ubiquitously held,11 but
 to varying degrees they are all false or at best superficial. There
 has no doubt been a deep ideological struggle in the tort law
 of the last century and a half. But, as I shall argue, it is not
 the struggle between negligence and fault on the one hand, and
 strict liability on the other. Rather, the confrontation is between
 portentous dissent of Chief Justice Burger in Bivens v. Six Unknown Named
 Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 4II (I97I).
 The distinctive characteristic of non-instrumentalist claims is that their validity
 does not depend on the consequences of the court's decision. Whether a court pro-
 tects judicial integrity or achieves a fair result turns on an assessment of the
 facts of the dispute, not on a correct prediction of what may follow.
 5 Calabresi's analysis is instructive. He reasons that the issue of fairness must
 involve "moral attitudes," CALABRESI 294, and then considers the taboo against
 fornication as an example of "moral attitudes." Id. at 295.
 6See, e.g., W. BLUM & H. KALVEN, PUBLIC LAW PERSPECTIVES ON A PRIVATE
 LAW PROBLEM: AUTO COMPENSATION PLANS (I965); Fleming, The Role of Negli-
 gence in Modern Tort Law, 53 VA. L. REV. 8I5 (I967).
 'See 0. HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 79-80 (i88i); Ames, Law and Morals,
 22 HARV. L. REV. 97, 99 (I908); p. 564 infra.
 8See, e.g., Lord Atkin's opinion in Donoghue v. Stevenson, [I932] A.C. 562,
 579.
 ' See J. SALMOND, LAW OF TORTS I2-I3 (6th ed. I924); cf. Smith, Tort and
 Absolute Liability -Suggested Changes in Classification (pts. I-3), 3o HARV. L.
 REV. 24I, 3I9, 409 (I9I7).
 10See Gregory, Trespass to Negligence to Absolute Liability, 37 VA. L. REV.
 359 (i95i).
 " Most treatise writers agree with this outline, though they may no longer
 regard strict liability as aberrant. See FLEmING, supra note i, at 289-go; HARPER
 & JAMES 785-88; W. PROSSER, THE LAW OF TORTS I6-I9 (4th ed. 1971) [herein-
 after cited as PROSSER].
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 540 HARVARD LAW REVIEW [Vol. 85:537
 two radically different paradigms for analyzing tort liability 12
 paradigms which represent a complex of views about (i) the ap-
 propriate standard of liability, (2) the appropriate style of legal
 reasoning, and (3) the relationship between the resolution of in-
 dividual disputes and the community's welfare.
 These paradigms of liability cut across traditional doctrinal
 lines,13 creating a deep ideological cleavage between two ways of
 resolving tort disputes. The conflict is whether judges should
 look solely at the claims and interests of the parties before
 the court, or resolve seemingly private disputes in a way that
 serves the interests of the community as a whole. From this
 cleavage spring divergent ways of looking at concepts like fault,
 rights of recovery, and excuses from liability. Do these concepts
 provide a medium of doing justice between the parties, or are they
 a medium for serving the interests of the community? A stand
 on this threshhold question generates an interrelated set of views,
 including a characteristic style of legal rhetoric. In this essay I
 wish to explicate these two paradigms of liability, show their op-
 eration in the case law 14 and thus enrich the conceptual tools
 with which we analyze tort liability and the patterns of tort his-
 tory.
 Of the two paradigms, I shall call the first the paradigm of
 reciprocity. According to this view, the two central issues of
 tort law - whether the victim is entitled to recover and whether
 the defendant ought to pay -are distinct issues, each resolvable
 without looking beyond the case at hand. Whether the victim is
 so entitled depends exclusively on the nature of the victim's
 activity when he was injured and on the risk created by the de-
 fendant. The social costs and utility of the risk are irrelevant, as
 12 There is admittedly an element of fashion in using words like "paradigm"
 and "model." My usage is patterned after T. KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC
 REVOLUTIONS (2d ed. I970), in which the concept of paradigmatic thinking is used
 to account for the varieties of scientific response to identical data. My underlying
 thought is that tort history is characterized by the same kind of conflict that
 marked the competition between the phlogiston and oxidation theories of burn-
 ing, id. at 53-56, or the conflict between Ptolemaic and Copernican astronomy.
 This approach is useful when what one wants to know is why judges (or scien-
 tists) are curious about and responsive to particular facts at particular stages of
 history. Kuhn, himself, suggests the analogy between legal and scientific pro-
 cesses; in explaining his concept of paradigm, he likens it to "an accepted judicial
 decision in the common law." Id. at 23.
 13 See pp. 550-5I infra.
 14 The text has the limited concern of assessing problems of fairness within
 a litigation scheme. There is growing skepticism whether one-to-one litigation
 is the appropriate vehicle for optimizing accidents and compensating victims.
 See, e.g., CALABRESI 297-99; Franklin, Replacing the Negligence Lottery: Compen-
 sation and Selective Reimbursement, 53 VA. L. REV. 774 (I967).
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 I972] FAIRNESS AND UTILITY 54I
 is the impact of the judgment on socially desirable forms of be-
 havior. Further, according to this paradigm, if the victim is en-
 titled to recover by virtue of the risk to which he was exposed,
 there is an additional question of fairness in holding the risk-
 creator liable for the loss. This distinct 15 issue of fairness is ex-
 pressed by asking whether the defendant's creating the relevant
 risk was excused on the ground, say, that the defendant could not
 have known of the risk latent in his conduct. To find that an act
 is excused is in effect to say that there is no rational, fair basis
 for distinguishing between the party causing harm and other
 people. Whether we can rationally single out the defendant as the
 loss-bearer depends on our expectations of when people ought to
 be able to avoid risks. As will become clear in the course of
 this discussion, these expectations should not always depend upon
 the social utility of taking risks; rather they should often depend
 on non-instrumentalist criteria for judging when men ought to
 be able to avoid excessive risks of harm. For example, the
 standard of uncommon "ultra-hazardous activities," introduced
 by the first Restatement 16 is apparently a non-instrumentalist
 standard: one looks only to the risk and not to its social utility
 to determine whether it is ultra-hazardous.17 Yet it is never made
 clear by the Restatement why extra-hazardous risks warrant
 "strict liability" while ordinarily hazardous risks do not.
 As part of the explication of the first paradigm of liability,
 I shall propose a specific standard of risk that makes sense
 of the Restatement's emphasis on uncommon, extra-hazardous
 "5There might be many standards of liability that would distinguish between
 the question of the victim's right to recover and the fairness of the risk-creator's
 rendering compensation. The writ of Trespass recognized the distinction, answering
 the first bv determining whether the injury was directly caused, see Scott v. Shep-
 herd, 96 Eng. Rep. 525, 526 (C.P. I773) (Blackstone, J.), and the second by
 assessing whether the risk-creating act was attributable to inevitable accident,
 see Cotterill v. Starkey, I73 Eng. Rep. 676 (Q.B. I839) (inevitable accident);
 Goodman v. Taylor, I72 Eng. Rep. io3I (K.B. i832) (inevitable accident);
 Beckwith v. Shordike, 98 Eng. Rep. 9I, 92 (K.B. 1767) (Ashton, J.) (defense of
 involuntary trespass approved in principle but rejected on the facts); Mitten v.
 Faudrye, 79 Eng. Rep. I259 (K.B. i625) (involuntary trespass). See generally 8
 W. HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 455-57 (2d ed. I937). Common
 law courts began to abandon the test of "directness" in the mid-nineteenth cen-
 tury, see note 86 infra, and in this century there has been no widely accepted
 criterion of risk other than the standard of reasonableness. As I shall show below,
 see pp. 556-59 infra, reasonableness is a standard that merges the issues of the
 victim's right to recover with the fairness of the risk-creator's rendering compensa-
 tion.
 "6RESTATEMENT OF TORTS ?? 5I9-20 (I938).
 17 But cf. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS ? 520(f) (Tent. Draft No. IO,
 i964) (recognizing "the value of an activity to the community" as a factor bearing
 on the classification of an activity as abnormally dangerous).
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 542 HARVARD LAW REVIEW [Vol. 85:537
 risks, but which shows that the Restatement's theory is part of
 a larger rationale of liability that cuts across negligence, inten-
 tional torts, and numerous pockets of strict liability. The gen-
 eral principle expressed in all of these situations governed by
 diverse doctrinal standards is that a victim has a right to recover
 for injuries caused by a risk greater in degree and different in
 order from those created by the victim and imposed on the de-
 fendant -in short, for injuries resulting from nonreciprocal
 risks. Cases of liability are those in which the defendant gener-
 ates a disproportionate, excessive risk of harm, relative to the
 victim's risk-creating activity. For example, a pilot or an airplane
 owner subjects those beneath the path of flight to nonreciprocal
 risks of harm. Conversely, cases of nonliability are those of
 reciprocal risks, namely those in which the victim and the de-
 fendant subject each other to roughly the same degree of risk.
 For example, two airplanes flying in the same vicinity subject
 each other to reciprocal risks of a mid-air collision. Of course,
 there are significant problems in determining when risks are non-
 reciprocal, and we shall turn to these difficulties later.18 For now,
 it is sufficient to note that the paradigm of reciprocity represents
 (i) a bifurcation of the questions of who is entitled to compensa-
 tion and who ought to pay, (2) a commitment to resolving both
 of those issues by looking only to the activity of the victim and
 the risk-creator, and (3) a specific criterion for determining who
 is entitled to recover for loss, namely all those injured by non-
 reciprocal risks.
 The conflicting paradigm of liability - which I shall call the
 paradigm of reasonableness - represents a rejection of non-
 instrumentalist values and a commitment to the community's
 welfare as the criterion for determining both who is entitled to
 receive and who ought to pay compensation. Questions that are
 distinct under the paradigm of reciprocity - namely, is the risk
 nonreciprocal and was it unexcused - are collapsed in this para-
 digm into a single test: was the risk unreasonable? The reason-
 ableness of the risk thus determines both whether the victim is
 entitled to compensation and whether the defendant ought to be
 held liable. Reasonableness is determined by a straightforward
 balancing of costs and benefits. If the risk yields a net social
 utility (benefit), the victim is not entitled to recover from the
 risk-creator; if the risk yields a net social disutility (cost), the
 victim is entitled to recover.'9 The premises of this paradigm are
 18 See pp. 5 7I-72 infra.
 '" This is a simpler statement of the blancing test known as the "Learned Hand
 formula," defined in United States v. Carroll Towing Co., I59 F.2d I69 (2d Cir.
 1947). The same inquiry has been used to define the defense of necessity to in-
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 I972] FAIRNESS AND UTILITY 543
 that reasonableness provides a test of activities that ought to be
 encouraged and that tort judgments are an appropriate medium
 for encouraging them.
 The function of both of these paradigms is to distinguish be-
 tween those risks that represent a violation of individual inter-
 ests and those that are the background risks that must be borne as
 part of group living. The difference between the two paradigms
 is captured by the test provided by each for filtering out back-
 ground risks. The paradigm of reciprocity holds that we may be
 expected to bear, without indemnification, those risks we all
 impose reciprocally on each other. If we all drive, we must suf-
 fer the costs of ordinary driving. The paradigm of reasonableness,
 on the other hand, holds that victims must absorb the costs of
 reasonable risks, for these risks maximize the composite utility
 of the group, even though they may not be mutually created
 background risks.
 The paradigm of reasonableness bears some resemblance to
 present-day negligence, but it would be a mistake to associate
 the two paradigms, respectively, with strict liability and negli-
 gence. As I shall argue, the paradigm of reciprocity cuts across
 strict liability, negligence and intentional torts, and the paradigm
 of reasonableness accounts for only a subset of negligence cases.
 A large number of negligence cases lend themselves to analysis
 under both paradigms. Suppose there is a collision between two
 drivers on the highway, neither of whom has done anything out
 of the ordinary. Neither would be liable to the other. That re-
 sult might be explained on the ground that the risks are recipro-
 cal; each endangers the other as much as he is endangered. Or
 nonliability might be explained on the ground that ordinary
 driving is a socially beneficial activity. As my exposition de-
 velops, I will account for this overlap and explain why some
 cases of negligence liability fit only under the paradigm of reason-
 ableness.
 II. THE PARADIGM OF RECIPROCITY
 A. The Victim's Right to Recover
 Our first task is to demonstrate the pervasive reliance of the
 common law on the paradigm of reciprocity. The area that most
 consistently reveals this paradigm is the one that now most lacks
 doctrinal unity - namely, the disparate pockets of strict liability.
 We speak of strict liability or "liability without fault" in cases
 tentional torts and crimes. See Mouse's Case, 77 Eng. Rep. I34I (K.B. I609)
 (justifying the jettisoning of ferry cargo to save the passengers); MODEL PENAL
 CODE ? 3.02 (Proposed Official Draft, I962).
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 544 HARVARD LAW REVIEW [Vol. 85:537
 ranging from crashing airplanes 20 to suffering cattle to graze on
 another's land.2' Yet the law of torts has never recognized a
 general principle underlying these atomistic pockets of liability.
 The Restatement's standard of ultra-hazardous activity speaks
 only to a subclass of cases. In general, the diverse pockets of
 strict liability represent cases in which the risk is reasonable and
 legally immune to injunction. They are therefore all cases of
 liability without fault in the limited sense in which fault means
 taking an unreasonable risk.22 Beyond these characteristics dis-
 tinguishing strict liability from negligence, there is no consensus
 of criteria for attaching strict liability to some risks and not to
 others.23
 I shall attempt to show that the paradigm of reciprocity ac-
 counts for the typical cases of strict liability 24 - crashing air-
 planes,25 damage done by wild animals,26 and the more common
 cases of blasting, fumigating and crop dusting.27 To do this, I
 shall consider in detail two leading, but seemingly diverse in-
 stances of liability for reasonable risk-taking -Rylands v.
 Fletcher 28 and Vincent v. Lake Erie Transportation Co.29 The
 point of focusing on these two cases is to generate a foundation
 20 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS ? 52oA (Tent. Draft No. I2, I966).
 21 McKee v. Trisler, 3II Ill. 536, I43 N.E. 69 (I924).
 22 The word "fault" is also used to refer to the absence of excusing conditions,
 see pp. 55I, 556-57 infra, and in this sense strict liability is not liability without
 fault.
 23 In Keeton, Is There a Place for Negligence in Modern Tort Law?, 53 VA. L.
 REV. 886, 894-96 (I967), the author synthesizes strict liability under the principle
 that every activity should be liable for its "distinctive risks."
 24 It is important to distinguish the cases of strict liability discussed here from
 strict products liability, a necessary element of which is an unreasonably danger-
 ous defect in the product. See Davis v. Wyeth Laboratories, Inc., 399 F.2d I2I
 (gth Cir. i968). See generally Traynor, The Ways and Meanings of Defective
 Products and Strict Liability, 32 TENN. L. REV. 363 (I965). Because of the mar-
 ket relationship between the manufacturer and the consumer, loss-shifting in
 products-liability cases becomes a mechanism of insurance, changing the question
 of fairness posed by imposing liability. See BLUM & KALVEN, supra note 6, at
 58-6 i.
 25 See p. 548 infra and note 20 supra; PROSSER 5I4-i6.
 26 E.g., Collins v. Otto, I49 Colo. 489, 369 P.2d 564 (i962) (coyote bite); Fil-
 burn v. People's Palace & Aquarium Co., 25 Q.B.D. 258 (I890) (escaped circus ele-
 phant). See generally PROSSER 496-503.
 27 E.g., Exner v. Sherman Power Constr. Co., 54 F.2d 5IO (2d Cir. I93I)
 (storing explosives) ; Western Geophysical Co. of America v. Mason, 240 Ark. 767,
 402 S.W.2d 657 (i966) (blasting); Luthringer v. Moore, 3I Cal. 2d 489, I90
 P.2d i (I948) (fumigating); Young v. Darter, 363 P.2d 829 (Okla. i96i) (crop
 dusting).
 28 I59 Eng. Rep. 737 (Ex. i865), rev'd, L.R. i Ex. 265 (i866), aff'd, L.R. 3
 H.L. 330 (i868).
 29 Io9 Minn. 456, I24 N.W. 22I (IgIo).
This content downloaded from 
            143.229.144.143 on Wed, 23 Sep 2020 01:23:03 UTC             
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
 I972] FAIRNESS AND UTILITY 545
 for inducing the claim that unexcused nonreciprocity of risk is
 the unifying feature of a broad spectrum of cases imposing lia-
 bility under rubrics of both negligence and strict liability.
 In Rylands v. Fletcher the plaintiff, a coal mine operator, had
 suffered the flooding of his mine by water that the defendant
 had pumped into a newly-erected reservoir on his own land. The
 water broke through to an abandoned mine shaft under the de-
 fendant's land and thus found its way to the plaintiff's adjoining
 mine. The engineers and contractors were negligent in not pro-
 viding stronger supports for the reservoir; yet because they were
 independent contractors, the defendant was not liable for their
 negligence. Though the defendant's erecting and maintaining the
 reservoir was legally permissible, the Exchequer Chamber found
 for the plaintiff,30 and the House of Lords affirmed.31 Blackburn's
 opinion in the Exchequer Chamber focused on the defendant's
 bringing on to his land, for his own purposes, "something which,
 though harmless whilst it remain there, will naturally do mischief
 if it escape." 32 Lord Cairns, writing in the House of Lords, rea-
 soned that the defendant's activity rendered his use of the land
 "non-natural"; accordingly, "that which the Defendants were
 doing they were doing at their own peril." 33
 Neither Blackburn's nor Cairns' account provides an adequate
 rationale for liability. It may be that a body of water will
 "naturally do mischief if it escapes," but so may many other
 things, like water in a pipe, oil in a furnace tank, and fire in a
 fireplace. It is unlikely that Blackburn would favor liability for
 the harmful consequences of all these risky practices. Cairns'
 rationale of non-natural use, for all its metaphysical pretensions,
 may be closer to the policy issue at stake in the dispute. The
 fact was that the defendant sought to use his land for a purpose
 at odds with the use of land then prevailing in the community.
 He thereby subjected the neighboring miners to a risk to which
 they were not accustomed and which they would not regard as
 a tolerable risk entailed by their way of life. Creating a risk
 different from the prevailing risks in the community might be
 what Lord Cairns had in mind in speaking of a non-natural use
 of the land. A better term might have been "abnormal" or "in-
 appropriate" use. Indeed these are the adjectives used in the
 proposed revision of the Restatement to provide a more faithful
 rendition of the case law tradition of strict liability.34
 30 L.R. i Ex. 265 (i866).
 31L.R. 3 H.L. 330 (i868).
 32LR. i Ex. at 279.
 3 L.R. 3 H.L. at 339.
 31 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) oF TORTs ? 520 (Tent. Draft No. i0, 1964).
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 546 HARVARD LAW REVIEW [Vol. 85:537
 A seemingly unrelated example of the same case law tradition
 is Vincent v. Lake Erie Transporation Co., a I9IO decision of
 the Minnesota Supreme Court.35 The dispute arose from a ship
 captain's keeping his vessel lashed to the plaintiff's dock during
 a two-day storm when it would have been unreasonable, indeed
 foolhardy, for him to set out to sea. The storm battered the ship
 against the dock, causing damages assessed at five hundred dol-
 lars. The court affirmed a judgment for the plaintiff even though
 a prior case had recognized a ship captain's right to take shelter
 from a storm by mooring his vessel to another's dock, even with-
 out consent.36 The court's opinion conceded that keeping the
 ship at dockside was justified and reasonable, yet it characterized
 the defendant's damaging the dock as "prudently and advisedly
 [availing]" himself of the plaintiff's property.37 Because the in-
 cident impressed the court as an implicit transfer of wealth, the
 defendant was bound to rectify the transfer by compensating the
 dock owner for his loss.38
 The rationales of Rylands and Vincent are obviously not
 interchangeable. Building a reservoir is not availing oneself of
 a neighbor's property. And mooring a ship to a wharf is not an
 abnormal or "non-natural" use of either the ship or the wharf.
 Yet by stripping the two cases of their rhetoric and by focusing
 on the risks each defendant took, one can bring the two cases
 within the same general principle. The critical feature of both
 cases is that the defendant created a risk of harm to the plaintiff
 that was of an order different from the risks that the plaintiff
 imposed on the defendant.
 Without the factor of nonreciprocal risk-creation, both cases
 would have been decided differently. Suppose that Rylands had
 built his reservoir in textile country, where there were numerous
 mills, dams, and reservoirs, or suppose that two sailors secured
 their ships in rough weather to a single buoy. In these situations
 each party would subject the other to a risk, respectively, of
 35 IO9 Minn. 456, I24 N.W. 22I (I9IO).
 36See Ploof v. Putnam, 8i Vt. 47I, 7I A. i88 (I908) (defendant dock owner,
 whose servant unmoored the plaintiff's ship during a storm, held liable for the
 ensuing damage to the ship and passengers).
 37 IO9 Minn. at 460, I24 N.W. at 222.
 38 This case is not entirely apt for my theory. The existence of a bargaining
 relationship between the defendant and the plaintiff poses the market adjustment
 problems raised in note 24 supra. See Calabresi, The Decision for Accidents: An
 Approach to Nonfault Allocation of Costs, 78 HARV. L. REV. 7I3, 726 (I965)
 (arguing the irrelevance of the result in Vincent as to both the efficient allocation
 of resources and the welfare of the parties). Accordingly, I treat the case as though
 the defendant were a type of ship owner who never had to enter into bargains
 with wharf owners. The case is also a seductive one for Professor Keeton. See
 Keeton, supra note i, at 4IO-I8; Keeton, supra note 23, at 895.
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 inundation and abrasion. Where the risks are reciprocal among
 the relevant parties, as they would be in these variations of Ry-
 lands and Vincent, a rule of strict liability does no more than
 substitute one form of risk for another - the risk of liability for
 the risk of personal loss.39 Accordingly, it would make little
 sense to extend strict liability to cases of reciprocal risk-taking,
 unless one reasoned that in the short run some individuals might
 suffer more than others and that these losses should be shifted
 to other members of the community.40
 Expressing the standard of strict liability as unexcused, non-
 reciprocal risk-taking provides an account not only of the Ry-
 lands and Vincent decisions, but of strict liability in general. It
 is apparent, for example, that the uncommon, ultra-hazardous
 activities pinpointed by the Restatement are readily subsumed
 under the rationale of nonreciprocal risk-taking. If uncommon
 activities are those with few participants, they are likely to be
 activities generating nonreciprocal risks. Similarly, dangerous
 activities like blasting, fumigating, and crop dusting stand out
 as distinct, nonreciprocal risks in the community. They represent
 threats of harm that exceed the level of risk to which all members
 of the community contribute in roughly equal shares.
 The rationale of nonreciprocal risk-taking accounts as well
 for pockets of strict liability outside the coverage of the Re-
 statement's sections on extra-hazardous activities. For example,
 an individual is strictly liable for damage done by a wild animal
 in his charge, but not for damage committed by his domesticated
 pet.41 Most people have pets, children, or friends whose presence
 39 A student note nicely develops this point in the context of ultra-hazardous
 activities. Note, Absolute Liability for Dangerous Things, 6i HARV. L. REV. 515,
 520 (I948).
 " One argument for so shifting losses would be that some individuals have
 better access to insurance or are in a position (as are manufacturers) to invoke
 market mechanisms to distribute losses over a large class of individuals. This argu-
 ment assumes that distributing a loss "creates" utility by shifting units of the loss
 to those who may bear them with less disutility. The premise is the increasing mar-
 ginal utility of cumulative losses, which is the inverse of the decreasing marginal
 utility of the dollar -the premise that underlies progressive income taxation. See
 Calabresi, Some Thoughts on Risk Distribution and the Law of Torts, 70 YALE
 L.J. 499, 5I7-I9 (I96I); Blum & Kalven, The Uneasy Case for Progressive Taxa-
 tion, I9 U. CHI. L. REV. 4I7, 455-79 (1952). This is an argument of distributive
 rather than corrective justice, for it turns on the defendant's wealth and status,
 rather than his conduct. Using the tort system to redistribute negative wealth
 (accident losses) violates the premise of corrective justice, namely that liability
 should turn on what the defendant has done, rather than on who he is. See
 THE NICOMACHEAN ETHICS OF ARISTOTLE, Book V, ch. 4, at II4-I5 (Ross transl.
 World's Classics ed. I954). What is at stake is keeping the institution of taxation
 distinct from the institution of tort litigation.
 41 See, e.g., Fowler v. Helck, 278 Ky. 36I, I28 S.W.2d 564 (I939); Warrick
 v. Farley, 95 Neb. 565, I45 N.W. I020 (I9I4).
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 creates some risk to neighbors and their property. These are
 risks that offset each other; they are, as a class, reciprocal risks.
 Yet bringing an unruly horse into the city goes beyond the ac-
 cepted and shared level of risks in having pets, children, and
 friends in one's household. If the defendant creates a risk that
 exceeds those to which he is reciprocally subject, it seems fair
 to hold him liable for the results of his aberrant indulgence.
 Similarly, according to the latest version of the Restatement, air-
 plane owners and pilots are strictly liable for ground damage,
 but not for mid-air collisions.42 Risk of ground damage is non-
 reciprocal; homeowners do not create risks to airplanes flying
 overhead. The risks of mid-air collisions, on the other hand,
 are generated reciprocally by all those who fly the air lanes.
 Accordingly, the threshold of liability for damage resulting from
 mid-air collisions is higher than mere involvement in the activity
 of flying. To be liable for collision damage to another flyer, the
 pilot must fly negligently or the owner must maintain the plane
 negligently; they must generate abnormal risks of collision to the
 other planes aflight.
 Negligently and intentionally caused harm also lend them-
 selves to analysis as nonreciprocal risks. As a general matter,
 principles of negligence liability apply in the context of activities,
 like motoring and sporting ventures, in which the participants
 all normally create and expose themselves to the same order of
 risk.43 These are all pockets of reciprocal risk-taking. Sometimes
 the risks are grave, as among motorists; sometimes they are
 minimal, as among ballplayers. Whatever the magnitude of risk,
 each participant contributes as much to the community of risk
 as he suffers from exposure to other participants. To establish
 liability for harm resulting from these activities, one must show
 that the harm derives from a specific risk negligently engendered
 in the course of the activity. Yet a negligent risk, an "unreason-
 able" risk, is but one that unduly exceeds the bounds of reciproc-
 ity. Thus, negligently created risks are nonreciprocal relative to
 the risks generated by the drivers and ballplayers who engage
 in the same activity in the customary way.
 If a victim also creates a risk that unduly exceeds the recip-
 rocal norm, we say that he is contributorily negligent and deny
 42 See note 20 supra.
 ' Negligence is, of course, prominent as well in the analysis of liability of
 physicians to patients and occupiers of land to persons injured on the premises. See
 Cohen, Fault and the Automobile Accident: The Lost Issue in California, I2
 U.C.L.A.L. REV. 164, I79 (I964). These are cases of injuries in the course of
 consensual, bargaining relationships and therefore pose special problems. Cf. note
 24 supra.
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 recovery.44 The paradigm of reciprocity accounts for the denial
 of recovery when the victim imposes excessive risks on the de-
 fendant, for the effect of contributory negligence is to render the
 risks again reciprocal, and the defendant's risk-taking does not
 subject the victim to a relative deprivation of security.45
 Thus, both strict liability and negligence express the rationale
 of liability for unexcused, nonreciprocal risk-taking. The only
 difference is that reciprocity in strict liability cases is analyzed
 relative to the background of innocuous risks in the community,
 while reciprocity in the types of negligence cases discussed above
 is measured against the background of risk generated in specific
 activities like motoring and skiing. To clarify the kinship of
 negligence to strict liability, one should distinguish between two
 different levels of risk-creation, each level associated with a de-
 fined community of risks. Keeping domestic pets is a reciprocal
 risk relative to the community as a whole; driving is a reciprocal
 risk relative to the community of those driving normally; and
 driving negligently might be reciprocal relative to the even nar-
 rower community of those driving negligently. The paradigm
 of reciprocity holds that in all communities of reciprocal risks,
 those who cause damage ought not to be held liable.46
 E.g., Butterfield v. Forrester, I03 Eng. Rep. 926 (K.B. I809) (defendant
 put a bar across the highway; plaintiff was riding without looking where he was
 going). In many cases of contributory negligence the risk is self-regarding and
 does not impose risks on the defendant. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS ? 463
 (I965); PROSSER 4I8-20. In these cases the rationale for denying recovery is
 unrelated to the paradigm of reciprocity. There is considerable dispute about what
 the rationale may be. Id. at 4I7-I8; HARPER & JAMES II93-I209.
 4 If the "last clear chance" doctrine is available, however, the victim may
 recover despite his contributory negligence. Peterson v. Burkhalter, 38 Cal. 2d
 I07, 237 P.2d 977 (i95i) (motorist's last clear chance vis-a-vis a negligent motor
 scooter driver); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS ?? 479-80 (I965). A rationale
 for this doctrine might be that the defendant's risk is nonreciprocal even as to the
 class of victims taking negligent risks.
 46 Suppose a motorist runs down a pedestrian on the way to his parked car.
 Or suppose that an ambulance injures a pedestrian while speeding through the
 streets to rescue another injured pedestrian. These hypothetical problems pose
 puzzles at the fringes of the paradigm of reciprocity. The first is the question
 whether reciprocity must be temporal; the second, whether the interests of the
 victim or of the class he represents ought to bear on the analysis of reciprocity.
 These problems require further thought. Cf. Professor Fried's theory of the risk
 pool, which treats risks occurring at different times as offsetting. C. FRIED, AN
 ANATOMY OF VALUES I77-93 (1970).
 Problems in defining communities of risks may account for the attractiveness
 of the reasonableness paradigm today. The increased complexity and interdepend-
 ence of modern society renders legal analysis based upon a concept of community
 that presupposes clear lines of membership, relatively little overlapping, and a
 fair degree of uniformity in the activities carried on, exceedingly difficult in many
 cases. Cf. pp. 57I-72 infra.
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 To complete our account of the paradigm of reciprocity, we
 should turn to one of its primary expressions: intentional torts,
 particularly the torts of battery and assault. Several features of
 the landlord's behavior in Carnes v. Thompson47 in lunging at
 the plaintiff and her husband with a pair of pliers make it stand
 out from any of the risks that the plaintiff might then have been
 creating in return. An intentional assault or battery represents
 a rapid acceleration of risk, directed at a specific victim. These
 features readily distinguish the intentional blow from the back-
 ground of risk. Perceiving intentional blows as a form of non-
 reciprocal risk helps us understand why the defendant's malice
 or animosity toward the victim eventually became unnecessary
 to ground intentional torts.48 The nonreciprocity of risk, and the
 deprivation of security it represents, render irrelevant the atti-
 tudes of the risk-creator.49
 All of these manifestations of the paradigm of reciprocity
 strict liability, negligence and intentional battery - express the
 same principle of fairness: all individuals in society have the
 right to roughly the same degree of security from risk. By
 analogy to John Rawls' first principle of justice,50 the principle
 might read: we all have the right to the maximum amount of
 security compatible with a like security for everyone else. This
 means that we are subject to harm, without compensation, from
 background risks, but that no one may suffer harm from addi-
 tional risks without recourse for damages against the risk-creator.
 Compensation is a surrogate for the individual's right to the same
 security as enjoyed by others. But the violation of the right to
 equal security does not mean that one should be able to enjoin
 the risk-creating activity or impose criminal penalties against
 the risk-creator. The interests of society may often require a
 disproportionate distribution of risk. Yet, according to the par-
 adigm of reciprocity, the interests of the individual require us
 to grant compensation whenever this disproportionate distribu-
 4748 S.W.2d 9o3 (Mo. I932).
 48 See Vosburg v. Putney, 8o Wis. 523, 50 N.W. 403 (I89I). Animosity would
 obviously be relevant to the issue of punitive damages, see PROSSER 9-IO, the
 formal rationales for which are retribution and deterrence, not compensation.
 4 This account of battery also explains the softening of the intent requirement
 to permit recovery when the defendant "knew to a substantial certainty" that his
 act would result in the victim's falling. Garratt v. Dailey, 46 Wash. 2d. I97, 279
 P.2d IOgI (i955) (defendant, a young boy, pulled a chair out from the spot where
 the victim was about to sit down).
 50 Rawls, Justice as Fairness, 67 PHILOSOPHICAL REV. I64, I65 (I958) (" [E]ach
 person participating in a practice, or affected by it, has an equal right to the most
 extensive liberty compatible with a like liberty for all."). The ideas expressed in
 Justice as Fairness are elaborated in J. RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971).
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 tion of risk injures someone subject to more than his fair share
 of risk.51
 B. Excusing Nonreciprocal Risks
 If the victim's injury results from a nonreciprocal risk of
 harm, the paradigm of reciprocity tells us that the victim is
 entitled to compensation. Should not the defendant then be un-
 der a duty to pay? Not always. For the paradigm also holds
 that nonreciprocal risk-creation may sometimes be excused, and
 we must inquire further, into the fairness of requiring the de-
 fendant to render compensation. We must determine whether
 there may be factors in a particular situation which would excuse
 this defendant from paying compensation.
 Though the King's Bench favored liability in its i6i6 deci-
 sion of Weaver v. Ward,52 it digressed to list some hypothetical
 examples where directly causing harm would be excused and
 therefore exempt from liability. One kind of excuse would be
 the defendant being physically compelled to act, as if someone
 took his hand and struck a third person.53 Another kind would
 be the defendant's accidentally causing harm, as when the plain-
 tiff suddenly appeared in the path of his musket fire.54 The
 rationale for denying liability in these cases, as the court put it,
 is that the defendant acted "utterly without . . . fault." 55
 If a man trespasses against another, why should it matter
 whether he acts with "fault" or not? What the King's Bench
 must have been saying is that if a man injures another without
 fault on his part, there is no rational and fair basis for charging
 the costs of the accident to him rather than to an arbitrary third
 person. The inquiry about fault and excusability is an inquiry
 about rationally singling out the party immediately causing harm
 as the bearer of liability. Absent an excuse, the trespassory, risk-
 creating act provides a sufficient basis for imputing liability.
 Finding that the act is excused, however, is tantamount to per-
 51 It might be that requiring the risk-creator to render compensation would
 be economically tantamount to enjoining the risk-creating activity. See note II5
 infra. If imposing a private duty of compensation for injuries resulting from
 nonreciprocal risk-taking has an undesirable economic impact on the defendant,
 the just solution would not be to deny compensation, but either to subsidize the
 defendant or institute a public compensation scheme.
 5280 Eng; Rep. 284 (K.B. i6i6).
 53Id.
 54 Id.
 55 "[T]herefore no man shall be excused of a trespass (for this is the nature of
 an excuse, and not of a justification, prout ei bene licuit) except it may be judged
 utterly without his fault." Id.
This content downloaded from 
            143.229.144.143 on Wed, 23 Sep 2020 01:23:03 UTC             
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
 552 HARVARD LAW REVIEW [Vol. 85:537
 ceiving that the act is not a factor fairly distinguishing the tres-
 passing party from all other possible candidates for liability.
 It is important to note that the inquiry whether the act sets
 the actor apart and makes him a fit candidate for liability was
 originally a non-instrumentalist inquiry. The King's Bench in
 I 6 I 6 did not ask: what good will follow from holding that
 physical compulsion and unavoidable accident constitute good
 excuses? 56 The question was rather: How should we perceive
 an act done under compulsion? Is it the same as no act at all?
 Or does it set the actor off from his fellow men? Thus, excusing
 is not an assessment of consequences, but a perception of moral
 equivalence. It is a judgment that an act causing harm ought to
 be treated as no act at all.
 The hypotheticals of Weaver v. Ward correspond to the
 Aristotelian excusing categories of compulsion and unavoidable
 ignorance.57 Each of these has spawned a line of cases denying
 liability in cases of inordinate risk-creation. The excuse of com-
 pulsion has found expression in the emergency doctrine, which
 excuses excessive risks created in cases in which the defendant
 is caught in an unexpected, personally dangerous situation.58 In
 Cordas v. Peerless Transportation Co.,59 for example, it was
 thought excusable for a cab driver to jump from his moving cab
 in order to escape from a threatening gunman on the running
 board. In view of the crowd of pedestrians nearby, the driver
 clearly took a risk that generated a net danger to human life.
 It was thus an unreasonable, excessive, and unjustified risk. Yet
 the overwhelmingly coercive circumstances meant that he, per-
 sonally, was excused from fleeing the moving cab.60 An example
 56 This is not to say that utilitarians have not attempted to devise an account of
 excuse based on the beneficial consequences to society of recognizing excuses. See
 J. BENTHAM, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND LEGISLATION
 I73 (1907). For an effective critique of Bentham, see H.L.A. Hart, Prolegomenon
 to the Principles of Punishment, 6o ARISTOTELIAN SoC'Y PROCEEDINGS I (1959), in
 H.L.A. HART, PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY (I968).
 57 THE NICOMACHEAN ETHIcS OF ARISTOTLE, supra note 40, Book III, ch. i,
 at 48 ("Those things, then, are thought involuntary, which take place under
 compulsion or owing to ignorance.").
 58 See e.g., St. Johnsbury Trucking Co. v. Rollins, I45 Me. 2I7, 74 A.2d 465
 (1950); Majure v. Herrington, 243 Miss. 692, I39 So. 2d 635 (i962). The excuse is
 not available if the defendant has created the emergency himself. See Whicher v.
 Phinney, I24 F.2d 929 (ist Cir. I942). See generally PROSSER i68-69.
 5 27 N.Y.S.2d i98 (N.Y. City Ct. I941).
 60The rhetoric of reasonableness obscures the difference between assessing the
 risk and excusing the defendant on the ground that pressures were too great to
 permit the right decision. Cf. p. 56o infra. Yet it is clear that the emergency
 doctrine functions as a personal excuse, for the defense is applicable even if the
 actor made the wrong choice, i.e., took an objectively unreasonable risk. See St.
 Johnsbury Trucking Co. v. Rollins, I45 Me. 2I7, 222, 74 A.2d 465, 468 (1950)
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 of unavoidable ignorance excusing risk-creation is Smith v.
 Lampe," in which the defendant honked his horn in an effort to
 warn a tug that seemed to be heading toward shore in a dense
 fog. As it happened, the honking coincided with a signal that
 the tug captain expected would assist him in making port. Ac-
 cordingly the captain steered his tug toward the honking rather
 than away from it. That the defendant did not know of the
 prearranged signal excused his contributing to the tug's going
 aground. Under the facts of the case, the honking surely cre-
 ated an unreasonable risk of harm. If instantaneous injunctions
 were possible, one would no doubt wish to enjoin the honking as
 an excessive, illegal risk. Yet the defendant's ignorance of that
 risk was also excusable. Under the circumstances he could not
 fairly have been expected to inform himself of all possible inter-
 pretations of honking in a dense fog.
 As expanded in these cases, the excuses of compulsion and
 unavoidable ignorance added dimension to the hypotheticals put
 in Weaver v. Ward. In Cordas and Smith we have to ask: What
 can we fairly expect of the defendant under the circumstances?
 Can we ask of a man that he remain in a car with a gun pointed
 at him? Can we require that a man inform himself of all local
 customs before honking his horn? Thus the question of rationally
 singling out a party to bear liability becomes a question of what
 we can fairly demand of an individual under unusual circum-
 stances. Assessing the excusability of ignorance or of yielding to
 compulsion can be an instrumentalist inquiry. As we increase or
 decrease our demands, we accordingly stimulate future behavior.
 Thus, setting the level of excusability could function as a level
 of social control. Yet one can also think of excuses as expressions
 of compassion for human failings in times of stress - expres-
 sions that are thought proper regardless of the impact on other
 potential risk-creators.
 Despite this tension between thinking of excusing conditions
 in an instrumentalist or non-instrumentalist way, we can formu-
 late two significant claims about the role of excuses in cases de-
 cided under the paradigm of reciprocity. First, excusing the risk-
 creator does not, in principle, undercut the victim's right to re-
 cover. In most cases, it is operationally irrelevant to posit a right
 to recovery when the victim cannot in fact recover from the ex-
 cused risk-creator. Yet it may be important to distinguish be-
 tween victims of reciprocal, background risks and victims of
 (admonishing against assessing the risk with hindsight); Kane v. Worcester Con-
 sol. St. Ry., i82 Mass. 20I, 65 N.E. 54 (I902) (Holmes, C.J.) (the choice "may be
 mistaken and yet prudent").
 6164 F.2d 20I (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 289 U.S. 75I (I933).
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 nonreciprocal risks. The latter class of victims - those who have
 been deprived of their equal share of security from risk - might
 have a claim of priority in a social insurance scheme. Further,
 for a variety of reasons, one might wish in certain classes of
 cases to deny the availability of particular excuses, such as in-
 sanity in general or immaturity for teenage drivers.62 Insanity
 has always been a disfavored excuse; even the King's Bench in
 Weaver v. Ward rejected lunacy as a defense.63 However, it is
 important to perceive that to reject the excuse is not to provide
 a rationale for recovery. It is not being injured by an insane
 man that grounds a right to recovery, but being injured by a
 nonreciprocal risk - as in every other case applying the para-
 digm of reciprocity. Rejecting the excuse merely permits the
 independently established, but previously unenforceable right to
 prevail.
 Secondly, an even more significant claim is that these excuses
 - compulsion and unavoidable ignorance - are available in all
 cases in which the right to recovery springs from being subjected
 to a nonreciprocal risk of harm. We have already pointed out
 the applicability of these excuses in negligence cases like Cordas
 and Smith v. Lampe. What is surprising is to find them applicable
 in cases of strict liability as well; strict liability is usually thought
 of as an area where courts are insensitive to questions of fairness
 to defendants. Admittedly, the excuses of compulsion and un-
 avoidable ignorance do not often arise in strict liability cases,
 for men who engage in activities like blasting, fumigating, and
 crop dusting typically do so voluntarily and with knowledge of
 the risks characteristic of the activity. Yet there have been cases
 in which strict liability for keeping a vicious dog was denied on
 the ground that the defendant did not know, and had no reason
 to know, that his pet was dangerous.64 And doctrines of proximate
 cause provide a rubric for considering the excuse of unavoidable
 ignorance under another name.65 In Madsen v. East Jordan
 62 Daniels v. Evans, I07 N.H. 407, 224 A.2d 63 (I966) rejected the defense of
 immaturity in motoring cases and thus limited Charbonneau v. MacRury, 84 N.H.
 50I, I53 A. 457 (i930) to cases in which the activity is "appropriate to [the
 minor's] age, experience and wisdom." I07 N.H. at 408, 224 A.2d at 64.
 63 "[T]herefore if a lunatick hurt a man, he shall be answerable in trespass
 ." 8o Eng. Rep. at 284. See Alexander & Szasz, Mental Illness as an Excuse
 for Civil Wrongs, 43 NOTRE DAME LAW. 24 (I967).
 64 See Fowler v. Helck, 278 Ky. 36i, I28 S.W.2d 564 (I939); Warrick v. Far-
 ley, 95 Neb. 565, I45 N.W. I020 (I9I4).
 65 In Fletcher v. Rylands, L.R. I Ex. 265, 279-80 (I866), Blackburn, J.,
 acknowledges the defenses of vis major and act of God. Both of these sound in
 a theory of excuse. Vis major corresponds to the excuse of physical compulsion
 recognized in Weaver v. Ward, 80 Eng. Rep. 284 (K.B. i6i6), and acts of God
 are risks of which the defendant is presumably excusably ignorant.
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 Irrigation Co.,66 for example, the defendant's blasting operations
 frightened the mother mink on the plaintiff's farm, causing them
 to kill 230 of their offspring. The Utah Supreme Court affirmed a
 demurrer to the complaint. In the court's judgment, the reaction
 of the mother mink "was not within the realm of matters to be
 anticipated." 67 This is precisely the factual judgment that would
 warrant saying that the company's ignorance of this possible
 result was excused,68 yet the rubric of proximate cause provided
 a doctrinally acceptable heading for dismissing the complaint.69
 It is hard to find a case of strict liability raising the issue of
 compulsion as an excuse. Yet if a pilot could flee a dangerous
 situation only by taking off in his plane, as the cab driver in
 Cordas escaped danger by leaping from his moving cab, would
 there be rational grounds for distinguishing damage caused by
 the airplane crash from damage caused by Cordas' cab? One
 would think not. Both are cases of nonreciprocal risk-taking,
 and both are cases in which unusual circumstances render it
 unfair to expect the defendant to avoid the risk he creates.
 The analysis of excuses in cases of strict liability would
 apply as well in cases of intentional torts. Yet there are some
 intentional torts, like trespass to land, where the excuse of un-
 avoidable ignorance is unavailable.70 Where the tort fulfills sub-
 sidiary noncompensatory purposes, such as testing the title to
 land, these divergent purposes might render excuses unavailable.71
 66 ioi Utah 552, I25 P.2d 794 (1942).
 671 Id. at 555, I25 P.2d at 795.
 68 Madsen is somewhat different from Smith v. Lampe, discussed at p. 553
 supra. In Smith the driver was ignorant that honking could have any harmful
 result. Here it is just the particular harm of which the defendant was unaware.
 69 There seem to be two different types of proximate cause cases: (i) those that
 function as a way of raising the excuse of unavoidable ignorance and (2) those
 that hold that the damage is so atypical of the activity that even if the actor knew
 the result would occur, he would not be liable. If there were a replay of the
 facts in Madsen, with the defendant knowing of the risk to the mink, one would
 be surprised if the result would be the same; on the other hand, if the oil
 company in Mauney v. Gulf Refining Co., I93 Miss. 42I, 9 So. 2d 780 (1942)
 knew of the risk that negligently starting a fire might startle a woman across
 the street, causing her to fall over a chair and suffer a miscarriage, the court would
 probably still find for the defendant. If this distinction is sound, it suggests that
 foreseeability is an appropriate test of proximate cause only in the first category,
 namely when the issue is really the excusability of the defendant's ignorance of the
 risk. Cf. pp. 57I-73 infra.
 70 See, e.g., Maye v. Tappan, 23 Cal. 306 (i863) (mistake of miner as to
 boundary between mines); Blatt v. McBarron, i6i Mass. 2I, 36 N.E. 468 (i894)
 (mistake of process server as to right of entry); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
 ? i64 (I965).
 71 If the defendant could prevail by showing that his mistake was reasonable,
 the court would not have to resolve the conflicting' claims of title to the land.
 Similarly, if the defendant in a defamation action could prevail by showing that
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 Where compensation is the primary issue, however, one may
 fairly conclude that the basic excuses acknowledged in Weaver
 v. Ward-compulsion and unavoidable ignorance-transcend
 doctrinal barriers and apply in all cases of nonreciprocal risk-
 taking.
 Recognizing the pervasiveness of nonreciprocity as a standard
 of liability, as limited by the availability of excuses, should pro-
 vide a new perspective on tort doctrine and demonstrate that
 strict liability and negligence as applied in the cases discussed
 above are not contrary theories of liability. Rather, strict lia-
 bility and negligence appear to be complementary expressions of
 the same paradigm of liability.
 III. THE PARADIGM OF REASONABLENESS
 Until the mid-nineteenth century, the paradigm of reciprocity
 dominated the law of personal injury. It accounted for cases of
 strict liability and of intentional torts and for the distinction
 implicit in the common law writ system between background
 risks and risks directly violating the interests of others.72 In the
 course of the nineteenth century, however, the concepts under-
 lying the paradigm of reciprocity gradually assumed new con-
 tours. A new paradigm emerged, which challenged all traditional
 ideas of tort theory. The new paradigm challenged the assump-
 tion that the issue of liability could be decided on grounds of
 fairness to both victim and defendant without considering the
 impact of the decisions on the society at large. It further chal-
 lenged the assumption that the victim's right to recovery was
 distinguishable from the defendant's duty to pay. In short, the
 new paradigm of reasonableness represented a new style of think-
 ing about tort disputes.
 The core of this revolutionary change was a shift in the
 meaning of the word "fault." At its origins in the common law
 of torts, the concept of fault served to unify the medley of ex-
 cuses available to defendants who would otherwise be liable in
 trespass for directly causing harm.73 As the new paradigm
 emerged, fault came to be an inquiry about the context and the
 he was reasonably mistaken about the truth of the defamatory statement, the court
 would never reach the truth or falsity of the statement. To permit litigation of the
 truth of the charge, the law of defamation rejects reasonable mistake as an excuse.
 See Corrigan v. Bobbs-Merrill Co., 228 N.Y. 58, 126 N.E. 260 (1920); Hulton &
 Co. v. Jones, [I909] 2 K.B. 444, aff'd, [I9I0] A.C. 20. In both of these cases,
 it was held irrelevant that the defendant did not intend his remarks to refer to
 the plaintiff.
 72 See notes I5 supra and 86 infra.
 73 See pp. 55I-52 supra.
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 reasonableness of the defendant's risk-creating conduct.74 Re-
 casting fault from an inquiry about excuses into an inquiry about
 the reasonableness of risk-taking laid the foundation for the new
 paradigm of liability. It provided the medium for tying the
 determination of liability to maximization of social utility, and
 it led to the conceptual connection between the issue of fault and
 the victim's right to recover. The essence of the shift is that the
 claim of faultlessness ceased being an excuse and became a jus-
 tification. The significance of this transformation is difficult to
 appreciate today, for the concepts of excuse and justification have
 themselves become obscure in our moral and legal thinking.75 To
 clarify the conceptual metamorphosis of the fault concept, I must
 pause to explicate the difference between justifying and excusing
 conduct.
 "Unreasonable risk-taking -doing that which a reasonable man would not
 do -is now the standard measure of negligence. See, e.g., PROSSER I45-5I; RE-
 STATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS ?? 282-83 (I965). But cf. MODEL PENAL CODE
 ? 2.02(2)(d) (Proposed Official Draft, i962) (defining negligence as the taking of
 a "substantial and unjustified risk" and invoking the reasonable man only to
 account for the blameworthiness of the negligent conduct).
 75 Inadequate appreciation for the distinction between excuse and justification
 is clearly seen today in negligence per se cases. Courts and commentators use the
 terms "justification" and "excuse" interchangeably to refer to the criteria defeating
 the statutory norm. See, e.g., Alarid v. Vanier, 50 Cal. 2d 617, 327 P.2d 897 (1958);
 HARPER & JAMES 1007-IO. As a consequence, they are unable to satisfactorily
 rationalize giving conclusive effect to the legislature's determination of safe con-
 duct while at the same time permitting the jury to make the final determination
 of the defendant's negligence. If excuse and justification are just two different
 labels for a univocal concept, these goals do appear incompatible; the statute can-
 not be conclusive on the issue of negligence if the jury also decides the same issue.
 Recognizing that the concept of fault is dualistic, that excusability is a separate
 dimension of fault, would enable courts to regard the violation of a statute as
 conclusive on negligence, but inconclusive on the excusability of the negligent con-
 duct. Thus, the legislature would be given its due without sacrificing justice to
 the individual defendant who can show, for example, that he was compelled to run
 the illegal risk or prevented from perceiving its magnitude.
 The distinction between excuse and justification in these cases was not always
 so obscure. See Martin v. Herzog, 228 N.Y. I64, I68, 126 N.E. 814, 8I5 (1920)
 (Cardozo, J.) (defining "the unexcused omission of the statutory signals" as negli-
 gence per se) (emphasis added).
 The MODEL PENAL CODE ?? 3.04(I), 3.11(l) (Proposed Official Draft, I962)
 (excused force is nevertheless unlawful force, but privileged or justified force is
 not), maintained a distinction between excuse and justification in formulating a
 definition of unlawful force for the purpose of delimiting the scope of self-defense.
 But this distinction did not survive adoptation of the CODE in Illinois and Wis-
 consin. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, ? 7 (I969); WIS. STAT. ? 939.42-.49 (I969).
 See also GA. CODE ? 26-ioii (1933) ("There being no rational distinction be-
 tween excusable and justifiable homicide, it shall no longer exist."), as amended
 ? 26-90I. The distinction is very much alive among philosophers, see, e.g., Austin,
 A Plea for Excuses, 57 ARISTOTELIAN Soc'Y PROCEEDINGS I (1956-57), in FREEDOM
 AND RESPONSIBILITY 6 (H. Morris ed. I96I).
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 The difference between justifying and excusing conditions is
 most readily seen in the case of intentional conduct, particularly
 intentional crimes. Typical cases of justified intentional conduct
 are self-defense 76 and the use of force to effect an arrest.77 These
 justificatory claims assess the reasonableness of using force under
 the circumstances. The questions asked in seeking to justify an
 intentional battery as self-defense relate to the social costs and
 the social benefits of using force and to the wrongfulness of the
 initial aggressor's conduct in attacking the defendant. The reso-
 lution of this cost-benefit analysis speaks to the legal permissi-
 bility and sometimes to the commendability of the act of using
 force under the circumstances. Excuses, in contrast, focus not on
 the costs and benefits of the act, but on the degree of the actor's
 choice in engaging in it. Insanity and duress are raised as ex-
 cuses even to concededly wrongful acts.78 To resolve a claim of
 insanity, we are led to inquire about the actor's personality, his
 capacities under stress and the pressures under which he was
 acting. Finding that the actor is excused by reason of insanity
 is not to say that the act was right or even permissible, but merely
 that the actor's freedom of choice was so impaired that he cannot
 be held accountable for his wrongful deed.
 Justifying and excusing claims bear different relationships to
 the rule of liability. To justify conduct is to say that in the
 future, conduct under similar circumstances will not be regarded
 as wrongful or illegal. Excusing conduct, however, leaves intact
 the imperative not to engage in the excused act. Acquitting a
 76 Self-defense is routinely referred to today as an instance of justification.
 See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE ? 3.04 (Proposed Official Draft, I962) (including
 self-defense in article 3 of the CODE, which is titled "General Principles of Justifica-
 tion"); CAL. PENAL CODE ? 197 (West 1970) ("justifiable homicide"); note 75
 supra. In contrast, Blackstone described se defendendo as an instance of excusable
 homicide. 4 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *183-84. In Blackstone's day, the
 rubric of excusable homicide applied to those cases in which the defendant suf-
 fered only forfeiture of goods, but not execution or other punishment. See R.
 PERKINS, CRIMINAL LAW 892 (1957).
 " The clearest case of common law justification was that of a legal official
 acting under authority of law. See 4 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *178-79.
 78 The MODEL PENAL CODE (Proposed Official Draft, I962) acknowledges that
 claims of insanity and duress are distinguishable from claims of justification and
 does not include them within article 3's "General Principles of Justification."
 Rather, they appear in ?? 4.0I and 2.09 respectively.
 The common law is ambivalent on the status of duress. The defense is not
 recognized in homicide cases, State v. Nargashian, 26 R.I. 299, 58 A. 953 (1904),
 thus suggesting that the focus of the defense may be the rightness of the defendant's
 act, rather than the involuntariness of the actor's response to external coercion.
 German law unequivocally acknowledges that duress is an excuse and that it
 applies even in homicide cases. STGB ? 52 (C.H. Beck 1970); A. SCH6NKE & H.
 SCHRODER, .STRATGESETZBUCH: KOMMENTAR 457 (I5th ed. 1970).
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 man by reason of insanity does not change the norm prohibiting
 murder. Rather, it represents a judgment that a particular per-
 son, acting under particular pressures at a particular time, can-
 not be held accountable for violating that norm. The difference
 between changing the rule and finding in a particular case that
 it does not apply is best captured by asking whether in finding
 for the defendant the court recognizes a right to engage in the
 activity. To justify conduct as self-defense is to recognize a
 right to use force, but to excuse homicide under duress is not to
 acknowledge a right to kill. It is rather to recognize that an
 actor cannot be fairly blamed for having succumbed to pressures
 requiring him to kill.79
 The distinction between justifying and excusing conduct ap-
 plies with equal coherence in analyzing risk-creating behavior.
 Questions about the excusability of risk-creation focus on the
 actor's personal circumstances and his capacity to avoid the risk.
 Could he have resisted the intimidations of a gunman in his car?
 Could he have found out about the risks latent in his conduct?
 Questions about justification, on the other hand, look solely to
 the risk, abstracted from the personality of the risk-creator. What
 are the benefits of the risk? What are the costs? Does the risk
 maximize utility? As the inquiry shifts from excusing to justify-
 ing risks, the actor and his traits become irrelevant. At the level
 of justification, the only relevant question is whether the risk, on
 balance, is socially desirable. Excusing a risk, as a personal judg-
 ment about the actor, leaves the right of the victim intact; but
 justifying a risk recognizes the defendant's right to run that risk
 vis-a-vis the victim. If the risk is justified in this sense, the
 victim could hardly have a claim against the risk-creator. The
 right of the risk-creator supplants the right of the victim to
 recover.80
 That the fault requirement shifted its orientation from ex-
 79 This is fairly clear in the law of se defendendo, which is the one instance in
 which the common law recognized an excuse to a homicide charge based on ex-
 ternal pressure rather than the propriety of the act. See E. COKE, THIRD IN-
 STITUTE *55; note 78 supra. For the defense to be available, the defedant had
 to first retreat to the wall if he could do so without risking his life and had
 to have no other means than the use of force for preserving his own life. Coke
 speaks of the killing in these cases as "being done upon inevitable cause." COKE,
 THIRD INSTITUTE *55.
 These issues are more thoroughly discussed in Fletcher, The Theory of Criminal
 Negligence: A Comparative Analysis, II9 U. PA. L. REV. 401 (I97I). For a
 general account of the deficiencies in the common law approach to excusing con-
 ditions, see G. Fletcher, The Individualization of Excusing Conditions, 1971 (un-
 published manuscript on file at the Harvard Law School Library).
 80T. COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF TORTS 8I (1879) ("That which it
 is right and lawful for one man to do cannot furnish the foundation for an action
 in favor of another.").
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 cusing to justifying risks had the following consequences: (i)
 fault became a judgment about the risk, rather than about the
 responsibility of the individual who created the risk; (2) fault
 was no longer a question of fairness to the individual, but an
 inquiry about the relative costs and benefits of particular risks;
 (3) fault became a condition for recognizing the right of the
 victim to recover. These three postures of the fault requirement
 diverged radically from the paradigm of reciprocity. Together,
 they provided the foundation for the paradigm of reasonableness,
 a way of thinking that was to become a powerful ideological force
 in tort thinking of the late nineteenth and twentieth centuries.81
 The reasonable man became a central, almost indispensable
 figure in the paradigm of reasonableness.82 By asking what a
 reasonable man would do under the circumstances, judges could
 assay the issues both of justifying and excusing risks. Reasonable
 men, presumably, seek to maximize utility; therefore, to ask what
 a reasonable man would do is to inquire into the justifiability of
 the risk.83 If the risk-running might be excused, say by reason
 of the emergency doctrine or a particular defect like blindness
 or immaturity, the jury instruction might specify the excusing
 condition as one of the "circumstances" under which the conduct
 of the reasonable man is to be assessed. If the court wished to
 include or exclude a teenage driver's immaturity as a possible
 excusing condition, it could define the relevant "circumstances"
 accordingly.84 Because the "reasonable man" test so adeptly
 encompasses both issues of justification and excuse, it is not
 surprising that the paradigm of reasonableness has led to the
 blurring of that distinction in tort theory.85
 81 The impact of the paradigm is not so much that negligence emerged as a
 rationale of liability, for many cases of negligence are compatible with the par-
 adigm of reciprocity. See PP. 548-49 supra. The ideological change was the con-
 version of each tort dispute into a medium for furthering social goals. See Pros-
 ser's discussion of "social engineering," PROSSER 14-I6. This reorientation of the
 process led eventually to the blurring of the issues of corrective justice and dis-
 tributive justice discussed at note 40 supra.
 82 For early references to "reasonableness" as the standard of negligence, see
 Blyth v. Birmingham Waterworks Co., 156 Eng. Rep. 1047 (Ex. I856); COOLEY,
 supra note 8o, at 662. But cf. Vaughan v. Menlove, 132 Eng. Rep. 490, 493
 (C.P. I837) ("a man of ordinary prudence"). Notions of "ordinary" and "nor-
 mal" men are compatible with the paradigm of reciprocity; reciprocal risks are
 those that ordinary men normally impose on each other. The shift to the "reason-
 able" man was significant, for it foreshadowed the normative balancing of the
 interests implicit in the concept of reasonableness as an objective standard.
 83 See PP. 558-59 supra.
 84 See note 62 supra.
 85 It is especially surprising that courts and commentators have not explicitly
 perceived that the emergency doctrine functions to excuse unreasonable risks. See
 cases cited note 58 supra; HARPER & JAMES 938-40; PROSSER I68-70.
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 No single appellate decision ushered in the paradigm of
 reasonableness. It derived from a variety of sources.86 If there
 was a pivotal case, however, it was Brown v. Kendall,87 decided
 by the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court in I850. The facts
 of the case were well-suited to blurring the distinction between
 excusing the defendant's ignorance and assessing the utility of
 the risk that he took. In an effort to separate two fighting dogs,
 Kendall began beating them with a stick. Brown was standing
 nearby, which Kendall presumably knew; and both he and Brown
 moved about with the fighting dogs. At one point, when he had
 just backed up to a position in front of Brown, Kendall raised
 his stick, hitting Brown in the eye and causing serious injury.
 Brown sought to recover on the writ of trespass, whereby tradi-
 tionally a plaintiff could establish a prima facie case simply by
 proving that his injuries were the direct result of the defendant's
 act - a relationship which clearly existed in the case.
 In order for the defendant to invoke the defense of inevitable
 accident, he would have had to show that he neither knew nor
 could have been expected to know Brown's whereabouts at the
 86 One can distinguish among the following strains that converged in the course
 of the nineteenth century:
 (i) the tendency to regard more and more affirmative conduct as equivalent
 to passive, background activity. The English courts took this view of activities
 that one had a right to engage in. See Tillett v. Ward, io Q.B.D. i7 (i882) (right
 to drive oxen on highway; no liability for damage to ironmonger's shop); Good-
 wyn v. Cheveley, 28 L.J. Ex. (n.s.) 298 (i859) (right to drive cattle on highway;
 no liability to neighboring property). The American courts started with the sug-
 gestion in Vincent v. Stinehour, 7 Vt. 62, 65 (i835), that duty-bound acts were
 to be treated like background risks. Brown v. Kendall, 6o Mass. (6 Cush.) 292,
 296 (I850), extended this category to include all acts "lawful and proper to do,"
 thus obliterating the distinction between background risks and assertive conduct.
 (2) the judgment that those who go near dangerous areas, like highways,
 "[take] upon themselves the risk of injury from that inevitable danger . . . ."
 Fletcher v. Rylands, 65 L.R. I Ex. 265, 286 (i866) (Blackburn, J.).
 (3) the indulgence by courts in a fallacious reinterpretation of older decisions,
 such as Gibbons v. Pepper, 87 Eng. Rep. 469 (K.B. i695), to stand for the propo-
 sition that if the act is "not imputable to the neglect of the party by whom it is
 done, or to his want of caution, an action of trespass does not lie . . ... Harvey
 v. Dunlop, Hill & Denio Supp. 193, 194 (N.Y. i843); cf. Vincent v. Stinehour,
 7 Vt. at 64 (If "no degree of blame can be imputed to the defendant, the conduct
 of the defendant was not unlawful."). The fallacy of this reasoning is the assump-
 tion that recognizing faultlessness as an excuse entailed an affirmative requirement
 of proving fault as a condition of recovery (fallacy of the excluded middle).
 (4) the positivist view that tort liability was functionally equivalent to crim-
 inal liability. I J. AUSTIN, LECTURES ON JURISPRUDENCE 4I6, 5I6-20 (3d ed. R.
 Campbell I869); J. SALMOND, LAW OF TORTS 12 (3d ed. 1912). According to
 this view, requiring an activity to pay its way is to impose a sanction for unlawful
 activity.
 87 60 Mass. (6 Cush.) 292 (i850).
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 moment he last raised the stick. Thus, to argue that he should
 be excused on the ground of ignorance, he would have had to
 show that the situation was such that it was expectable and
 blameless for him not to inform himself better of Brown's posi-
 tion before the fateful blow. But an inquiry about the accepta-
 bility of the defendant's ignorance as an excuse leads to a broader
 assessment of the defendant's conduct in putting himself in a
 position where he unwittingly created a risk of harm to Brown.
 There is an important difference between (i) looking at the nar-
 rower context to determine whether at the moment of heightened
 risk - when Kendall raised the stick - his ignorance was ex-
 cusable and (2) broadening the context and thereby leveling the
 risk by shifting the inquiry from the moment of the stick-raising
 to the general activity of separating the dogs. Observing that
 distinction was essential to retaining faultlessness as a question
 of excusing, rather than justifying trespassory conduct. Yet it
 was a distinction that had lost its conceptual force. The trial
 judge and Chief Justice Shaw, writing for the Supreme Judicial
 Court, agreed that the defense of inevitable accident went to the
 adequacy of the defendant's care under the circumstances.88 But
 the two judges disagreed on the conceptual status of the issue of
 the required care. The trial judge, in line with several centuries
 of case authority, saw the issue as an exception to liability, to be
 proven by the defendant.89 Shaw converted the issue of the de-
 fendant's failure to exercise ordinary care into a new premise of
 liability, to be proven by the plaintiff, thus signaling and end to
 direct causation as a rationale for prima facie liability.90
 Admittedly, Brown v. Kendall could be read as a revision of
 the standard for excusing unwitting risk-creation: instead of
 extraordinary care, ordinary care should suffice to admit igno-
 rance as an excuse; and it should be up to the plaintiff to prove
 the issue. Though the case might have yielded this minor modi-
 fication of the law, Chief Justice Shaw's opinion created possi-
 bilities for an entirely new and powerful use of the fault standard,
 and the judges and writers of the late nineteenth and early twen-
 tieth centuries responded sympathetically.91
 88Their difference was one of degree. The trial judge thought the issue was
 whether the defendant had exercised extraordinary care, id. at 293; Judge Shaw
 saw the issue as one of ordinary care, id. at 296.
 89Id. at 294.
 90Id. at 297.
 9' American authorities readily came to the conclusion that fault-based negli-
 gence and intentional battery exhausted the possibilities for recovery for personal
 injury. See COOLEY, supra note 8o, at 8o, I64; cf. 3 S. GREENLEAF, EVIDENCE 74
 (2d ed. i848) (pre-Brown v. Kendall). Trespass survived much longer in the
 English literature. See Goodhart & Winfield, Trespass and Negligence, 49 L.Q.
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 Shaw's revision of tort doctrine made its impact in cases in
 which the issue was not one of excusing inadvertent risk-creation,
 but one of justifying risks of harm that were voluntarily and
 knowingly generated. Consider the following cases of risk-cre-
 ation: (i) the defendant operates a streetcar, knowing that the
 trains occasionally jump the tracks;92 (2) the defendant police
 officer shoots at a fleeing felon, knowing that he thereby risks
 hitting a bystander;93 (3) the defendant undertakes to float logs
 downriver to a mill, knowing that flooding might occur which
 could injure crops downstream.94 All of these victims could re-
 ceive compensation for their injuries under the paradigm of reci-
 procity, as incorporated in the doctrine of trespassory liability;
 the defendant or his employees directly and without excuse caused
 the harm in each case. Yet as Brown v. Kendall was received into
 the tort law, the threshold of liability became whether, under all
 the circumstances, the defendant acted with ordinary, prudent
 care. But more importantly, the test of ordinary care transcended
 its origins as a standard for determining the acceptability of
 ignorance as an excuse, and became a rationale for determining
 when individuals could knowingly and voluntarily create risks
 without responsibility for the harm they might cause. The test
 for justifying risks became a straightforward utilitarian compari-
 son of the benefits and costs of the defendant's risk-creating
 activity.95 The assumption emerged that reasonable men do what
 REV. 359 (1933); Roberts, Negligence: Blackstone to Shaw to ? An Intellectual
 Escapade in a Tory Vein, 50 CORNELL L. REV. 191 (I965). However, Roberts
 argued that trespass died among English practitioners well before the academic
 commentators wrote its obituary. Id. at 207-08.
 92 See Felske v. Detroit United Ry., i66 Mich. 367, 371-72, 130 N.W. 676, 678
 (I9II); Kelly v. United Traction Co., 88 App. Div. 234, 235-36, 85 N.Y.S. 433,
 434 (1903). But cf. Chicago Union Traction Co. v. Giese, 229 Ill. 260, 82 N.E.
 232 (1907) (applying res ipsa loquitur). Some of the earlier cases exonerating
 transportation interests were Beatty v. Central Iowa Ry., 58 Iowa 242, 12 N.W.
 332 (I882) (employing cost-benefit analysis to hold railroad need not eliminate all
 risk when designing a grade crossing); Bielenberg v. Montana Union Ry., 8 Mont.
 271, 20 P. 314 (I889) (statute making railroads absolutely liable for injury to live-
 stock held unconstitutional; liability had to be based on negligence); Steffen v.
 Chicago & N.W. Ry., 46 Wis. 259, 50 N.W. 348 (I879) (train caused rock to shoot
 up and hit employee standing nearby; judgment for plaintiff reversed).
 9 Brown v. Kendall had an immediate impact in Morris v. Platt, 32 Conn.
 75, 79-80 (I864) (liability for gun shot wound to bystander only if firing was
 negligent as to bystander) ; see Paxton v. Boyer, 67 Ill. I32 (i873) ; Shaw v.
 Lord, 41 Okla. 347, I37 P. 885 (I9I4).
 94See Hopkins v. Butte & M. Commercial Co., 13 Mont. 223, 33 P. 8I7 (I893)
 (defendant's floating logs caused stream to dam, flooding plaintiff's land and de-
 stroying crops; no liability in the absence of negligence).
 9 The utilitarian calculus did not become explicit until Terry explicated the
 courts' thinking in his classic article, Terry, Negligence, 29 HARV. L. REV. 40
 (19I5).
This content downloaded from 
            143.229.144.143 on Wed, 23 Sep 2020 01:23:03 UTC             
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
 564 HARVARD LAW REVIEW [Vol. 85:537
 is justified by a utilitarian calculus, that justified activity is law-
 ful, and that lawful activities should be exempt from tort liability.
 In the cases mentioned above, the arguments are readily at
 hand for maximizing utility by optimizing accidents: (i) the
 expense of providing rails to prevent streetcars from leaving the
 tracks would require a substantial increase in streetcar fares -
 it is better that occasional accidents occur; (2) capturing fleeing
 felons is sufficiently important to warrant a few risks to onlook-
 ers; (3) transporting logs sufficiently furthers the social good to
 justify some risks to farmers. More generally, if promoting the
 general welfare is the criterion of rights and duties of compensa-
 tion, then a few individuals must suffer. One might fairly wonder,
 however, why streetcar passengers, law enforcement, and the
 lumber industry should prosper at the expense of innocent vic-
 tims.
 IV. UTILITY AND THE INTERESTS OF THE INDIVIDUAL
 The accepted reading of tort history is that the rise of the
 fault standard in the nineteenth century manifested a newly
 found sensitivity to the morality of legal rules. James Barr Ames
 captured orthodox sentiments with his conclusion that " [t] he
 ethical standard of reasonable conduct has replaced the unmoral
 standard of acting at one's peril." 9 This reading of the case
 law development finds its source in Holmes' dichotomy between
 acting at one's peril and liability based on fault.97 The assump-
 tion of Holmes' influential analysis is that there are only two
 doctrinal possibilities: the fault standard, particularly as ex-
 pressed in Brown v. Kendall,98 and strict or absolute liability.
 The latter is dubbed unmoral; therefore, the only option open to
 morally sensitive theorists would appear to be liability for fault
 alone.
 The mistake in this reading of legal history is the unanalyzed
 assumption that every departure from the fault standard par--
 takes of the strict liability expressed in the maxim "a man acts
 at his peril." There are in fact at least four distinct points on
 the continuum from strict liability to the limitation on liability
 introduced by Brown v. Kendall. In resolving a routine trespass
 dispute for bodily injury, a common law court might, among other
 things:
 (i) reject the relevance of excuses in principle and rule for the
 plaintiff;
 96 Ames, Law and Morals, supra note 7, at 99.
 97 See HOLMES, supra note 7, at 79-80.
 98See pp. 56I-62 supra.
This content downloaded from 
            143.229.144.143 on Wed, 23 Sep 2020 01:23:03 UTC             
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
 1972] FAIRNESS AND UTILITY 565
 (2) recognize the principle of excusing trespassory conduct, but
 find under the facts of the case that the defendant's conduct
 was unexcused;
 (3) find that the defendant's conduct was excused and therefore
 exempt from liability;
 (4) recognize reasonableness as a justification for directly caus-
 ing harm to another.
 If the maxim "acting at one's peril" connotes a standard that
 is "unmoral"-a standard that is insensitive to the fairness of
 imposing liability - then the charge properly attaches only to
 the first of the above four categories. It is only in this situation
 that authoring harm is conclusive on liability. Yet there are few,
 if any, unequivocal examples of this form of decision in the com-
 mon law tradition.99 After Weaver v. Ward,100 one can hardly
 speak of the common law courts maintaining, as a principle, that
 excusing conditions are irrelevant to liability.101
 Cases of the second type did abound at the time of Holmes'
 writing.102 They represent victories for injured plaintiffs, but
 they affirm, at least implicitly, the traditional requirement that
 the act directly causing harm be unexcused. Yet Holmes treats
 these cases as instances of absolute liability, of "acting at one's
 peril." 103 In so doing, he ignores the distinction between reject-
 9 Even in The Thorns Case, Y.B. Mich. 6 Edw. 4, f.7, pl. i8 (I466), reprinted
 in C. FIFOOT, HISTORY AND SOURCES OF THE COMMON LAW 195 (1949), where the
 defendant was liable in trespass for entering on plaintiff's land to pick up thorns
 he had cut, Choke, C.J., said the defendant would have a good plea if "he [had
 done . . . all that was in his power to keep them out]." Id. at I96.
 10080 Eng. Rep. 284 (K.B. i6i6); see pp. 55I-52 supra.
 101 See generally Wigmore, Responsibility for Tortious Acts: Its History, 7
 HARV. L. REV. 44I (I894); Winfield, The Myth of Absolute Liability, 42 L.Q. REV.
 37 (I926).
 102 In some cases, the unexcused nature of the defendant's risk-taking was
 obvious on the facts. See Leame v. Bray, 102 Eng. Rep. 724 (K.B. I803) (de-
 fendant was driving on the wrong side of the highway; issue was whether trespass
 would lie); Underwood v. Hewson, 93 Eng. Rep. 722 (K.B. 1724) (defendant
 cocked gun and it fired; court held trespass would lie). In Dickenson v. Watson,
 84 Eng. Rep. I2I8 (K.B. I682) the court said that the claim of "unavoidable neces-
 sity" was not adequately shown. In a third type of case, plaintiffs received verdicts
 despite instructions requiring the jury to assess the excusability of the defendant's
 act. See Goodman v. Taylor, I72 Eng. Rep. I03I (K.B. I832); cf. Castle v. Duryee,
 2 Keyes I69, 174 (N.Y. i865) (suggesting that the instructions were too favorable
 to the defendant).
 103 HOLMES, supra note 7, at 87-89. Holmes relies heavily on a quote from
 Grose, J., in Leame v. Bray, I02 Eng. Rep. 724, 727 (K.B. I803): "[I]f . . . the
 act of the party . . . be the immediate cause of [the injury], though it happen
 accidentally or by misfortune, . . . he is answerable in trespass." Yet Grose, J.,
 relies on Underwood v. Hewson, 93 Eng. Rep. 722 (K.B. I724), and Weaver v.
 Ward, 8o Eng. Rep. 284 (K.B. I6I6), see pp. 55I-52, both of which at least
 implicitly recognize excusing conditions. Holmes supposed that if one were liable
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 ing excuses in principle (type one) and rejecting an alleged excuse
 on the facts of the case (type two). There is an obvious differ-
 ence between finding for the plaintiff regardless of fault and find-
 ing for the plaintiff because the defendant fails to convince the
 trier of fact that he acted "utterly without fault." By ignoring
 this difference, as well as the distinction between denying fault by
 claiming an excuse and urging reasonableness as a justification,
 Holmes could generate a dichotomy that made Brown v. Kendall
 seem like an admirable infusion of ethical sensitivity into tort
 doctrine.
 But the issue in the nineteenth century was not the choice
 between strict liability on the one hand and liability based on
 fault on the other. Nor was it a simplistic choice between an
 "unmoral" standard and an ethical one. Rather, the question of
 the time was the shape that the fault standard would take. Should
 the absence of fault function as an excuse within a paradigm of
 reciprocity? Or should it function as a standard for exempting
 from liability risks that maximize utility? That was the moral
 and policy question that underlay the nineteenth century revolu-
 tion in tort thinking. The question posed by the conflict of par-
 adigms was whether traditional notions of individual autonomy
 would survive increasing concern for the public welfare. If the
 courts of the time had clearly perceived and stated the issue,
 they would have been shaken by its proportions.
 The same fundamental conflict between the public interest
 and individual autonomy arose even more sharply in criminal
 cases that reached the courts in the late nineteenth century. The
 public interest found expression in tort disputes by decisions pro-
 tecting activities thought to be socially useful, and in criminal
 cases by decisions designed to deter activities thought to be so-
 cially pernicious. Just as one goal of social policy might require
 some innocent accident plaintiffs to suffer their injuries without
 compensation, the other might require some morally innocent
 defendants to suffer criminal sanctions. Indeed, both matters re-
 ceived decisive judicial action in the same decade. Shortly before
 Chief Justice Shaw laid the groundwork in Brown v. Kendall 104
 for exempting socially useful risks from tort liability,'05 he ex-
 pressed the same preference for group welfare over individual
 autonomy in criminal cases. In Commonwealth v. Mash 106 he
 for an "accidental" injury, then liability, in some sense, violated principles of
 fairness; but the terms "accident" and "misfortune" are perfectly compatible with
 unexcused risk-taking.
 10460 Mass. (6 Cush.) 292 (I850).
 105 See pp. 56i-62 supra.
 10648 Mass. (7 Met.) 472 (I844).
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 generated a rationale for a bigamy conviction against a woman
 who sincerely regarded her absent husband as dead. Shaw tac-
 itly conceded that Mrs. Mash was not blameworthy for entering
 into the second marriage.107 Yet that mattered little, he argued,
 for preventing bigamy was "essential to the peace of families and
 the good order of society. ... 108 Thus, in Shaw's mind, the
 social interest in deterring bigamy justified convicting a morally
 innocent woman.109 Shaw's decision in Mash was of the same
 ideological frame as his rewriting of tort doctrine in Brown v.
 Kendall. If a judge is inclined to sacrifice morally innocent
 offenders for the sake of social control, he is also likely to require
 the victims of socially useful activities to bear their injuries with-
 out compensation.110 It is not at all surprising, then, that the
 rise of strict liability in criminal cases parallels the emergence
 of the paradigm of reasonableness in the law of negligent torts.111
 If it is unorthodox to equate strict liability in criminal cases with
 a species of negligence in tort disputes, it is only because we
 are the victims of the labels we use. If we shift our focus from
 the magic of legal rubrics to the policy struggle underlying tort
 and criminal liability, then it is quite clear that the appropriate
 analogy is between strict criminal liability and the limitation im-
 posed by the rule of reasonableness in tort doctrine.
 107 Shaw acknowledged the distinction between the "criminal intent" that ren-
 dered an actor blameworthy and the "criminal intent" that could be imputed to
 someone who voluntarily did the act prohibited by the legislature. Id. at 474. It
 was only in the latter sense, Shaw conceded, that Mrs. Mash acted with "criminal
 intent." Id.
 108 Id. at 473.
 109 Before sentence was pronounced, Mrs. Mash received a full pardon from
 the Governor. Id. at 475.
 lo Recent decisions of the California courts express the opposite position. The
 California Supreme Court has sought to protect morally innocent criminal de-
 fendants, People v. Hernandez, 6i Cal. 2d 529, 393 P.2d 673, 39 Cal. Rptr. 36i
 (1964) (recognizing reasonable mistake as to girl's age as a defense in statutory
 rape cases); People v. Vogel, 46 Cal. 2d 798, 299 P.2d 850 (I956) (recognizing
 reasonable mistake of marital status as a defense in bigamy cases), and at the
 same time it has extended protection to innocent accident victims, Elmore v.
 American Motors Corp., 70 Cal. 2d 578, 45I P.2d 84, 75 Cal. Rptr. 652 (i969)
 (strict products liability extended to bystanders).
 1"' If this thesis is correct, it suggests that the change in judicial orientation
 in the late nineteenth century was both beneficial and harmful to large business
 enterprises. Limiting tort liability to negligence was obviously helpful in reducing
 the costs of doing business; but imposing strict liability on corporate officers raised
 the nonmonetary costs of production and marketing. See, e.g., People v. Roby, 52
 Mich. 577, i8 N.W. 365 (i884) (proprietor held strictly liable for Sunday sale of
 liquor by his clerk without proprietor's knowledge or intent); Regina v. Stephens,
 [i866] L.R. i Q.B. 702 (quarry owner held strictly liable for his workmen's
 dumping refuse).
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 Not surprisingly, then, the contemporary arguments against
 the utilitarianism expressed in strict criminal liability 112 yield a
 critique of the rule of reasonableness in tort doctrine. As applied
 in assessing strict criminal liability, the utilitarian calculus treats
 the liberty of the morally innocent individual as an interest to be
 measured against the social interest in deterring criminal con-
 duct; it is a matter of judgment whether to favor the interests
 of the individual or the interests of society. But there are some
 sacrifices of individual liberty that persons cannot be expected
 to make for the welfare of their neighbors. In criminal cases,
 the claim of those opposing strict liability is that no man should
 be forced to suffer a condemnatory sanction just because his con-
 duct happens to cause harm or happens to contravene a statute.
 Something more is required to warrant singling out a particular
 defendant and subjecting him to sanctions in the interest of de-
 terring would-be offenders. There must be a rationale for over-
 coming his prima facie right to be left alone. That rationale is
 provided in the contemporary critical literature by the insistence
 that only culpable offenders be subject to sanctions designed to
 deter others.113 Culpability serves as a standard of moral for-
 feiture.114 It provides a standard for assessing when, by virtue
 of his illegal conduct, the defendant should be treated as having
 forfeited his freedom from sanctions.
 Just as an individual cannot be expected to suffer criminal
 sanctions for the sake of the common good, he cannot fairly be
 expected to suffer other deprivations in the name of a utilitarian
 calculus. His life, bodily integrity, reputation, privacy, liberty
 and property - all are interests that might claim insulation from
 deprivations designed to further other interests. Insulation might
 take the form of criminal or- injunctive prohibitions against con-
 duct causing undesired deprivations. But criminal and injunctive
 sanctions are questionable where the activity is reasonable in the
 sense that it maximizes utility and thus serves the interests of
 the community as a whole. Protecting the autonomy of the indi-
 vidual does not require that the community forego activities that
 serve its interests. In the case of socially useful activities, then,
 insulation can take the form of damage awards shifting the cost
 of the deprivation from the individual to the agency unexcusably
 112 See, e.g., H. PACKER, THE LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL SANCTION 62-135
 (1968); Dubin, Mens Rea Reconsidered: A Plea for A Due Process Concept of
 Criminal Responsibility, I8 STAN. L. REV. 322 (I966); Griffiths, Book Review, 79
 YALE L.J. I388 (1970).
 113 See PACKER, supra note II2, at 62-70; Dubin, supra note II2, at 365-66.
 114 Culpability may also function as a standard of moral desert. I have at-
 tempted to clarify the difference between these two functions in Fletcher, supra
 note 79, at 4I7-I8.
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 causing it. The burden should fall on the wealth-shifting mech-
 anism of the tort system to insulate individual interests against
 community demands. By providing compensation for injuries
 exacted in the public interest, the tort system can protect indi-
 vidual autonomy by taxing, but not prohibiting, socially useful
 activities.115
 V. THE INTERPLAY OF SUBSTANCE AND STYLE
 The conflict between the paradigm of reasonableness and the
 paradigm of reciprocity is, in the end, a struggle between two
 strategies for justifying the distribution of burdens in a legal
 system. The strategy of utility proceeds on the assumption that
 burdens are fairly imposed if the distribution optimizes the in-
 terests of the community as a whole. The paradigm of reciprocity,
 on the other hand, is based on a strategy of waiver. It takes as
 its starting point the personal rights of individuals in society to
 enjoy roughly the same degree of security, and appeals to the
 conduct of the victims themselves to determine the scope of the
 right to equal security. By interpreting the risk-creating activi-
 ties of the defendant and of the victim as reciprocal and thus
 offsetting, courts may tie the denial of liability to the victim
 to his own waiver of a degree of security in favor of the pursuit
 of an activity of higher risk.
 These two paradigms, and their accompanying strategies for
 distributing burdens, overlap in every case in which an activity
 endangers outsiders not participating in the creation of the risk.
 Where the courts deny liability, say, for leaving a golf club
 where a child might pick it up and swing it,116 they must decide
 whether to appeal either to the paradigm of reciprocity and argue
 that the risk is an ordinary, reciprocal risk of group living, or
 to the paradigm of reasonableness and argue that the activity is
 socially beneficent and warrants encouragement. They must de-
 cide, in short, whether to focus on the parties and their relation-
 ship or on the society and its needs. In these cases where the
 paradigms overlap, both ways of thinking may yield the same
 result. Yet the rhetoric of these decisions creates a pattern that
 influences reasoning in cases in which the paradigms diverge.
 The major divergence is the set of cases in which a socially
 useful activity imposes nonreciprocal risks on those around it.
 115 But cf. New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (i964), expressing the
 view that in some situations tort liability impermissibly inhibits the exercise of
 freedom of the press. If the liberty to create risks were conceived as analagous to
 free speech, the same criticism would apply to the argument of the text.
 116 See Lubitz v. Wells, i9 Conn. Supp. 322, II3 A.2d I47 (Super. Ct. I955).
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 These are the cases of motoring, airplane overflights, air pollu-
 tion, oil spillage, sonic booms - in short, the recurrent threats of
 modern life.1"7 In resolving conflict between those who benefit
 from these activities and those who suffer from them, the courts
 must decide how much weight to give to the net social value of
 the activity. In Boomer v. Atlantic Cement Co.,118 the New
 York Court of Appeals reflected the paradigm of reciprocity by
 defining the issue of holding a cement company liable for air pol-
 lution as a question of the "rights of the parties," 119 rather than
 the "promotion of the general public welfare." 120 Similarly, in
 its recent debate over the liability of airplane owners and opera-
 tors for damage to ground structures, the American Law Institute
 faced the same conflict. It too opted for the paradigm of re-
 ciprocity.121
 A variation on this conflict of paradigms emerges when a
 bystander, injured by a motorist, sues the manufacturer of the
 vehicle on the theory that a defect in the vehicle caused the acci-
 dent. In these cases, the ultimate issue is whether the motoring
 public as a whole should pay a higher price for automobiles in
 order to compensate manufacturers for their liability costs to
 pedestrians. The rationale for putting the costs on the motoring
 public is that motoring, as a whole, imposes a nonreciprocal risk
 on pedestrians and other bystanders. In addressing itself to
 this issue in Elmore v. American Motors Corp.,122 the California
 Supreme Court stressed the inability of bystanders to protect
 themselves against the risk of defective automobiles. Though it
 grouped pedestrians together with other drivers in extending strict
 products liability, the Elmore opinion appears to be more ori-
 ented to questions of risk and of who subjects whom to an exces-
 sive risk than it is to the reasonableness and utility of motoring.
 117There is considerable support among commentators for classifying many of
 these activities as ultra-hazardous in order to impose liability regardless of their
 social value. See, e.g., Avins, Absolute Liability for Oil Spillage, 36 BROOKLYN
 L. REV. 359 (1970); Baxter, The SST: From Watts to Harlem in Two Hours, 2I
 STAN. L. REV. I, 50-53 (I968).
 118 26 N.Y.2d 2I9, 257 N.E.2d 870, 309 N.Y.S.2d 3I2 (1970).
 119 26 N.Y.2d at 222, 257 N.E.2d at 87I, 309 N.Y.S.2d at 3I4.
 120 Id. In deciding whether to grant an injunction in addition to imposing
 liability for damages, however, the court did consider the economic impact of
 closing down the cement factory. 26 N.Y.2d at 225, 257 N.E.2d at 873, 309
 N.Y.S.2d at 316.
 121 The Institute initially took the position that only abnormal aviation risks
 should generate liability for ground damage, see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) oF TORTS
 ? 520A (Tent. Draft No. ii, I965), and then, reversing itself the following ses-
 sion, voted to encompass all aviation risks to ground structure within the rule
 of strict liability, see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) Or TORTS ? 52oA, Note to Institute
 at I (Tent. Draft No. I2, I966).
 122 70 Cal. 2d 6I5, 45I P.2d 84, 75 'Cal. Rptr. 652 (i969).
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 Thus, this opinion, too, hints at a reawakening of sensitivity to
 the paradigm of reciprocity.
 On the whole, however, the paradigm of reasonableness still
 holds sway over the thinking of American courts. The reasonable
 man is too popular a figure to be abandoned. The use of litigation
 to pursue social goals is well entrenched. Yet the appeal to the
 paradigm might well be more one of style than of substance.
 In assessing the reasonableness of risks, lawyers ask many
 seemingly precise questions: What are the consequences of the
 risk, its social costs and social benefits? What specific risks are
 included in the "ambit of the risk"? One can speak of formulae,
 like the Learned Hand formula,l23 and argue in detail about
 questions of costs, benefits and trade-offs. This style of thinking
 is attractive to the legal mind. Its tracings in proximate cause
 cases are the formulae for defining the scope of the risk. Thus
 Palsgraf enthrones the "eye of reasonable vigilance" to rule over
 "the orbit of the duty." 124 And the standard of "foreseeability"
 has become the dominant test of proximate cause.125 With close
 examination one sees that these formulae are merely tautological
 constructs designed to support an aura of utilitarian precision.
 Only if remote consequences are defined out of existence can
 one total up the benefits and the costs of all (known) conse-
 quences. The test of "foreseeability" permits balancing by re-
 strictively defining the contours of the scales. Unforeseeable
 risks cannot be counted as part of the costs and benefits of the
 risk; for, after all, they are unforeseeable and therefore unknow-
 able.126 There may be much work to be done in explaining why
 this composite mode of thought - the idiom of balancing, orbits
 of risk and foreseeability - has captured the contemporary legal
 mind. But there is little doubt that it has, and this fashionable
 style of thought buttresses the substantive claims of the paradigm
 of reasonableness.
 The paradigm of reciprocity, on the other hand, for all its
 substantive and moral appeal, puts questions that are hardly
 123 See note I9 supra.
 124Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R., 248 N.Y. 339, 343, i62 N.E. 99, IOO (I928).
 125 PROSSER 267; WINFIELD ON TORT 9I-92 (8th ed. J. Jolowicz & T. Lewis
 1967). The case adopting the test for the Commonwealth is Overseas Tankship
 (U.K.) Ltd. v. Morts Dock & Engineering Co. Ltd. (The Wagon Mound), [i96i]
 A.C. 388. But cf. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS ? 435 (no liability for "highly
 extraordinary" consequences).
 126 Though this aspect of the test is only dimly perceived in the literature,
 many scholars favor the test of "foreseeability" (or its equivalent) on the ground
 that it renders the issue of proximate cause symmetrical with the issue of negligence.
 See R. KEETON, LEGAL CAUSE IN THE LAW OF TORTS I8-20 (I963); Pollack,
 Liability for Consequences, 38 L.Q. REV. i65, I67 (I922).
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 likely to engage the contemporary legal mind: When is a risk
 so excessive that it counts as a nonreciprocal risk? When are
 two risks of the same category and thus reciprocally offsetting?
 It is easy to assert that risks of owning a dog offset those of
 barbecuing in one's backyard, but what if the matter should be
 disputed? There are at least two kinds of difficulties that arise
 in assessing the relationship among risks. The first is that of
 protecting minorities. Does everyone have to engage in crop
 dusting for the risk to be reciprocal, or just half the community?
 A tempting solution to the problem is to say that as to someone
 not engaged in the activity, the risks are per se nonreciprocal.
 But the gains of this simplifying stroke are undercut by the
 assumption necessarily implicit in the concept of reciprocitv that
 risks are fungible with others of the same "kind." Yet how does
 one determine when risks are counterpoised as species of the
 same genus? If one man owns a dog, and his neighbor a cat,
 the risks presumably offset each other. But if one man drives
 a car, and the other rides a bicycle? Or if one plays baseball in
 the street and the other hunts quail in the woods behind his
 house? No two people do exactly the same things. To classify
 risks as reciprocal risks, one must perceive their unifying fea-
 tures. Thus, risks of owning domestic animals may be thought
 to be of the same kind. And, theoretically, one might argue with
 equal vigor that all sporting activities requiring the projection
 of objects through the air create risks of the same order, whether
 the objects be baseballs, arrows, or bullets. Determining the
 appropriate level of abstraction is patently a matter of judgment;
 yet the judgments require use of metaphors and images - a way
 of thinking that hardly commends itself as precise and scientific.
 In proximate cause disputes the analogue to this style of
 thinking is the now rejected emphasis on the directness and
 immediacy of causal links, as well expressed in the Polemis
 12712
 case a d Judge Andrews' dissent in Palsgraj.128 As Hart and
 Honore have recognized,129 we rely on causal imagery in solving
 problems of causal connection in ordinary, nonlegal discourse.
 Why, then, does the standard of "direct causation" strike many
 today as arbitrary and irrational? 130 Why does metaphoric think-
 ing command so little respect among lawyers? 131 Why not agree
 "27In re Polemis, [I92I] 3 K.B. 560.
 128Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R., 248 N.Y. 339, 347, i62 N.E. 99, Ioi (I928).
 129H.L.A. HART & A. HONORE, CAUSATION IN THE LAW 24-57, 64-76 (I959).
 130 See, e.g., PROSSER 264 ("this approach [i.e. direct causation] is obviously
 an arbitrary one"); Seavey, Mr. Justice Cardozo and the Law of Torts, 39
 COLUM. L. REV. 20, 37, 52 HARV. L. REV. 372, 389, 48 YALE L.J. 390, 407 (I939)
 ("those using the test of directness are merely playing with a metaphor").
 131 Part of the reaction against writers like Beale, The Proximate Consequences-
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 with Judge Andrews that the issue of proximate cause is akin to
 assessing when a stream merges with waters of another source? 132
 Metaphors and causal imagery may represent a mode of
 thought that appears insufficiently rational in an era dominated
 by technological processes. Yet why should the rhetoric of rea-
 sonableness and foreseeability appeal to lawyers as a more sci-
 entific or precise way of thinking? The answer might lie in the
 scientific image associated with passing through several stages
 of argument before reaching a conclusion. The paradigm of
 reasonableness requires several stages of analysis: defining the
 risk, assessing its consequences, balancing costs and benefits. The
 paradigm of reciprocity requires a single conclusion, based on
 perceptions of similarities, of excessiveness, and of directness. If
 an argument requires several steps, it basks in the respectability
 of precision and rationality. Yet associating rationality with
 multistaged argumentation may be but a spectacular lawyerly
 fallacy - akin to the social scientists' fallacy of misplaced con-
 creteness (thinking that numbers make a claim more accurate).
 Whether or not multistaged argumentation is more rational
 than a perception of directness or excessiveness, one cannot but
 be impressed with the interplay of substantive and stylistic cri-
 teria in the conflict between the two paradigms of tort liability.
 Protecting innocent victims from socially useful risks is one issue.
 The relative rationality of defining risks and balancing conse-
 quences is quite another. That there are these two levels of
 tension helps explain the ongoing vitality of both paradigms of
 tort liability.
 The courts face the choice. Should they surrender the indi-
 vidual to the demands of maximizing utility? Or should they
 continue to protect individual interests in the face of community
 needs? To do the latter, courts and lawyers may well have to
 perceive the link between achieving their substantive goals and
 explicating their value choices in a simpler, sometimes metaphoric
 style of reasoning.
 of an Act, 33 HARV. L. REV. 633 (I920), is that metaphoric thinking is "mechani-
 cal" and insensitive to issues of "policy." PROSSER 264. Legal realism made it
 unfashionable to try to solve policy problems with verbal formulae and common
 sense rules. See HART & HONORE, supra note I29, at 92-93.
 132 248 N.Y. at 352, I62 N.E. at I03.
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